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
MICHEL FOUCAULT



Security, Territory, Population

LECTURES AT THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE,

1977-1978



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- fundamental situation of scarcity; confronted by a nature that in itself is inert and, save for one very small part, barren, man risks his life. It is no longer in the interplay of representation that economics finds its principle, but near that perilous region where life is in confrontation with death. And thus economics refers us to that order of somewhat ambiguous considerations which may be termed anthropological: it is related, in fact, to the biological properties of a human species, which, as Malinuss showed in the same period as Ricardo, tends always to increase unless prevented by some remedy or constraint (...)."
43. See, *Les Mots et les Choses*, ch. V, "Classer," pp. 140-144 (II, L'histoire naturelle) and pp. 150-158 (IV, Le caractère); *The Order of Things*, ch. 5, "Classifying"; II, Natural history, pp. 128-132, and IV, Character, pp. 138-145.
44. *Ibid.* ch. VII: "Les limites de la représentation," pp. 238-245 (III, L'organisation des êtres); *Ibid.* ch. VII: "The limits of representation," III, The organic structure of beings, trans. *ibid.* ch. 7: "The limits of representation," III, The organic structure of beings, pp. 226-232, especially the pages devoted to Larmarck, who is credited with having "prougnt the era of natural history to a close" and half-opened that of biology, not with his transformist theses, but the distinction he establishes between "the space of organic structure and that of nonmendature."
45. See *ibid.* pp. 287-288; trans. *ibid.* pp. 274-276. The problem Foucault refers to here concerns the respective places that should be attributed to Larmarck and Cuvier in the history of the nascent biology. Was Larmarck, with his transformist intuitions "which seem to 'redfigure' what was to be evolutionism," more modern than Cuvier, attached to an "old fixism, impregnated through and through with traditional prejudices and theological postulates" (p. 287; trans. p. 274)? Rejecting the summary opposition, the result of a "whole series of analogies, metaphors, and inadequately tested analogies" (*ibid.*) between the "progressive" thought of the former and the "reactionary" thought of the latter, Foucault shows that, paradoxically, "[h]istoricity (...)" has now been introduced into nature" (p. 288; trans. p. 276) with Cuvier—as a result of discovery of the discontinuity of living forms, which broke with the ontological continuity still accepted by Larmarck—and that in this way the possibility of evolutionist thought is opened up. A broadly convergent analysis of the problem is presented by F. Jacob in *Le Logique du vivant*, pp. 171-175; *The Logic of Living Systems*, pp. 156-157, that Foucault praised in a review, "Croûture et multipier," *Le Monde*, no. 8037, 15-16 November 1970; *Dis et Earth*, 2, pp. 99-104.
46. See *Les Mots et les Choses*, ch. VIII: "Tavai, vie, langage," pp. 275-292 (III, Cuvier); *The Order of Things*, ch. 8: "Labour, life, language," III, Cuvier, pp. 263-280. See also the lecture given by Foucault at the "Journées Cuvier" at the Institut d'histoire des sciences, in May 1969: "La situation de Cuvier dans l'histoire de la biologie," *Revue d'histoire des sciences et de leurs applications*, vol. XXIII (1), January-March 1970, pp. 63-92; *Dis et Earth*, 2, pp. 30-36, with discussion pp. 36-66.
47. Foucault does not deal with this question in *Les Mots et les Choses*; *The Order of Things*. See "La situation de Cuvier," p. 36.
48. See *Les Mots et les Choses*, ch. IV: "Parler," pp. 95-107 (II, La grammaire générale), ch. VIII: "Tavai, vie, langage," pp. 292-307 (V, Bopp); *The Order of Things*, ch. 4: "Speaking"; II General grammar, pp. 81-92, and ch. 8, "Labour, life, language," V, Bopp, pp. 280-294, and Foucault's introduction to A. Arnauld and C. Lancelot, *Grammaire générale et raisonnée* (Paris: Republiations Paulot, 1969) pp. iii-xxvii; *Dis et Earth*, 1, pp. 732-752.



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The problem of "government" in the sixteenth century. ~ Multiplicity of practices of government (government of self, government of souls, government of children, etcetera). ~ The specific problem of the government of the state. ~ The point of repulsion of the literature on government: Machiavelli's *The Prince*. ~ Brief history of the reception of *The Prince* until the nineteenth century. ~ The art of government distinct from the Prince's simple artfulness. ~ Example of this new art of government: Gaillaume de la Perrière *Le Miroir politique* (1555). ~ A government that finds its end in the "things" to be directed. ~ Decline of law to the advantage of a variety of tactics. ~ The historical and institutional obstacles to the implementation of this art of government until the eighteenth century. ~ The problem of population an essential factor in unblocking the art of government. ~ The triangle formed by government, population, and political economy. ~ Questions of method: the project of a history of "governmentality." ~ Overvaluation of the problem of the state.

* A first transcription of this lecture was published in the Italian journal, *Aut-Aut*, no. 167-168, Sept.-Dec. 1978, reproduced in *Acts*, special issue, 54, *Foucault hors les murs*, Summer 1986, pp. 6-15, and reproduced in the same form, according to the editors' criteria, in *Dis et Earth*, 3, pp. 635-657, with the title "La 'governmentalité.'" Our version has been completely revised on the basis of the recordings and manuscript. [A first English version, translated from the Italian by Rosi Brardotti, appeared in the English journal *Let's C*, no. 6, Autumn 1979, and was republished, revised by Colin Gordon, in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller, eds. *The Foucault Effect. Studies in Governmentality* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991; republished in Foucault, *Essential Writings*, 3: *Power*). I have consulted and benefited from this version in making this new translation; C.B.]

THROUGH THE ANALYSIS OF some mechanisms of security I have tried to see how the specific problems of population emerged, and last week, looking more closely at these problems we were quickly led to the problem of government. In short, in the last lectures we were concerned with the establishment of the series security—population—government. I would now like to begin to make a bit of an inventory of this problem of government.

There was, of course, no shortage of treatises in the Middle Ages and in Greco-Roman antiquity that presented themselves as advice to the prince, concerning how he should conduct himself, exercise power, and obtain the acceptance or respect of his subjects, on the love of God and obedience to him, the enforcement of his law in the cities of men, and so on. But I think it is quite striking that, from the sixteenth century, and throughout the period going roughly from the middle of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, there is a flourishing development of a significant series of treatises that do not exactly present themselves as advice to the prince, nor yet as political science, but which, between advice to the prince and treatises of political science, are presented as arts of government. I think that the general problem of "government"* suddenly breaks out in the sixteenth century with respect to many different problems at the same time and in completely different aspects. There is the problem of the government of oneself, for example. The sixteenth century returns to Stoicism revolves around this reactualization of the problem of how to govern oneself. There is also the problem of the government of souls and of conduct, which was, of course, the problem of Catholic or Protestant pastoral doctrine. There is the problem of the government of children, with the emergence and development of the great problematic of pedagogy in the sixteenth century. And then, perhaps only the last of these problems, there is that of the government of the state by the prince. How to govern oneself, how to be governed, by whom should we accept to be governed, how to be the best possible governor? It seems to me that all these problems, both in their intensity and multiplicity, are typical of the sixteenth century and, putting it very schematically, are at the point of intersection of two movements, two processes. There is, of course, the process that, dismantling feudal

* In inverted commas in the manuscript, p. 2.

structures, organizes and sets up the great territorial, administrative, and colonial states. Then there is a completely different movement, but with complex interactions with the first—there is no question of analyzing all this here—that, with the Reformation and then the Counter Reformation, questions how one wishes to be spiritually directed here on earth for one's salvation. On the one hand, there is the movement of state centralization, and, on the other, one of religious dispersion and dissidence: I think it is at the meeting point of these two movements that the problem arises, with particular intensity in the sixteenth century, of "how to be governed, by whom, to what extent, to what ends, and by what methods." A general problematic of government in general is, I think, the dominant feature of this question of government in the sixteenth century.

Within this enormous literature on government, which gets going then, or anyway breaks out, explodes in the middle of the sixteenth century, and extends until the end of the eighteenth century with the transformation I will try to identify, I would like to pick out just some noteworthy points in what is an immense, as well as monotonous, literature. I would like to pick out the points concerning the actual definition of the government of the state, of what we would call, if you like, the political form of government. The simplest way of identifying some of these noteworthy points would no doubt be to compare this mass of literature on government with a text that from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century was a sort of constant point of repulsion (*point de repulsion*) for this literature on government. This abominable text, in relation to which, by opposition [to which], and [through the] rejection of which the literature of government situated itself, is obviously Machiavelli's *The Prince*.² The history of this text is interesting; or rather, it would be interesting to trace the relationships between this text and all those that followed it, criticized it, and rejected it.

[We should remember first of all] that, rather than being immediately abominated, Machiavelli's *The Prince* was honored by his contemporaries and immediate successors, and was again honored at the end of the eighteenth century, or rather right at the start of the nineteenth century, precisely when all this literature on the art of government is

disappearing. Machiavelli's *The Prince* reappears at the beginning of the nineteenth century, especially in Germany moreover, where it is translated, prefaced, and commented upon by people like Rehberg,³ Leo,⁴ Ranke,⁵ and Kellerman,⁶ and in Italy also with Ridolfi,⁷ and I think—this will have to be analyzed, I am putting it in a completely summary way—in the context of, on the one hand, Napoleon, of course, but also in a context created by the Revolution and the problem of the Revolution, that is to say⁸. How and under what conditions can a sovereign maintain his sovereignty? This is also a context of the emergence, with Clausewitz, of the problem of the relations between politics and strategy, of the political importance, evident at the 1815 Congress of Vienna,⁹ of relationships of force and of the calculation of relationships of force as the principle of intelligibility and rationalization of international relations. Finally, it is a context of the problem of the territorial unity of Italy and Germany, since you know that Machiavelli was precisely one of those who sought to define the conditions for the territorial unification of Italy.

This is the climate then in which Machiavelli reappears at the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, between the honor accorded Machiavelli at the beginning of the sixteenth century and this rediscovery and re-evaluation at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it is clear that there was an extensive body of anti-Machiavelli literature. Sometimes this was explicit: there are a number of books that generally came from Catholic milieus, often from the Jesuits. There is, for example, Ambrogio Politi's *Disputations de libris a Christiano detestandis*,¹⁰ that is to say, as far as I know, *Discussion of books that Christians must detest*; there is the book of someone who had the misfortune to have the name Gentillet, and the first name Innocent, who wrote one of the first texts against Machiavelli called, *Discours d'Etat sur les moyens de bien gouverner contre Nicolas Machiavel*,¹¹ and, in this explicitly anti-Machiavellian literature, we find the later text of Frederick the Great in 1740.¹² But there is also an implicit literature taking the position of hidden and muted opposition to Machiavelli. For example, there is the English book by Thomas Elyot, *The Governour*, published in 1580,¹³ Paruta's *La Perfection de la vie politique*,¹⁴ and maybe one of the first, which I shall look at, Guillaume de La Perrière's

Le Miroir politique, published in 1555.*¹⁵ Whether this anti-Machiavellianism is overt or surreptitious, the important thing is that its function is not just the negative one of a barrier against, or the censure and rejection of the unacceptable, and, notwithstanding our modern taste for this kind of analysis—you know: faced with such a powerful and subversive thought, so in advance of itself, every run-of-the-mill discourse has to obstruct it by essentially repressive means—I don't think this is what is interesting in the anti-Machiavelli literature.¹⁶ I would like to consider this anti-Machiavelli literature as a positive genre, with its specific object, concepts, and strategy.

So, let's look at this implicitly or explicitly anti-Machiavellian literature. What do we find in it? Obviously, negatively, we find a sort of shallow representation of Machiavelli's thought. An adverse Machiavelli is given or reconstructed, whom the author needs, moreover, in order to say what he has to say. How does this literature characterize this more or less reconstructed Prince, against whom one struggles, or against whom one wants to say something else? (Obviously, I am not raising the question of in what respects, or to what extent, this Prince really does resemble Machiavelli's Prince.)

First, the Prince is characterized by a single principle. For Machiavelli, the Prince exists in a relationship of singularity and externality, of transcendence, to his principality. Machiavelli's Prince receives his principality either through inheritance, or by acquisition, or by conquest; in any case, he is not a part of it, but external to it. It makes no difference whether the link that binds him to his principality is one of violence, or tradition, or one established through the compromise of treaties and the complicity or agreement of other princes, it is, in any case, a purely synthetic link: there is no fundamental, essential, natural, and juridical connection between the Prince and his principality: externality, the Prince's transcendence, is the principle. A corollary of this principle is, of course, that inasmuch as it is an external relationship, it is fragile and constantly under threat. It is threatened from outside, by the Prince's enemies who want to take, or re-conquer, his principality, and it is also threatened internally, for there is no a priori or immediate

* M.F.: 1567

reason for the Prince's subjects to accept his rule. Third, an imperative is deduced from this principle and its corollary, which is that the objective of the exercise of power is, of course, to maintain, strengthen, and protect the principality. More exactly, it will be to protect the principality understood as the relationship of the Prince to what he possesses, to the territory he has inherited or acquired, and to his subjects, rather than the principality as the whole, the objective territory, if you like, constituted by the subjects and the territory. What is to be protected is the principality as the relationship of the Prince to his subjects and his territory, and not directly, immediately, fundamentally, or primarily, the territory and its inhabitants. The object of the art of governing, the art of being Prince that Machiavelli puts forward, must be this fragile link between the Prince and his principality.

One consequence of this is that the mode of analysis has two aspects. On the one hand, it involves the identification of dangers: where they come from, in what they consist, and their comparative severity; what is the greater danger, and what the lesser? The second aspect is the art of manipulating relations of force that enable the Prince to protect his principality, the link binding him to his subjects and his territory. Broadly speaking, from between the lines of these implicitly or explicitly, anti-Machiavellian treatises, *The Prince* emerges as a treatise on the Prince's ability to hold on to his principality. The anti-Machiavellian literature wanted to replace this ability, this know-how, with something different and new: an art of government. Being able to hold on to one's principality is not the same as possessing the art of governing; the art of government is something else. What does it comprise?

To pick out things in their still crude state, I will take one of the first texts in this large anti-Machiavellian literature, Guillaume de La Perrière's, *Le Miroir politique, contenant diverses manières de gouverner*,¹⁷ from 1555.* In this text, which is disappointing, especially in comparison with Machiavelli himself, some important things are nevertheless outlined. First, what does La Perrière understand by "to govern" and "governor"; how does he define these terms? On page 23 of his text he

* M.F.: 1567 [same date in the manuscript].

says: "Governor may be applied to any monarch, emperor, king, prince, lord, magistrate, prelate, judge, and the like."¹⁸ Like La Perrière, others who write about the art of government also recall that we also talk about "governing" a household, souls, children, a province, a convent, a religious order, and a family.

These comments, which seem to be and are purely terminological, actually have important political implications. Machiavelli's Prince, or how he is represented in this literature, is by definition, in terms of what was seen as the book's fundamental principle, unique in his principality and in a position of externality and transcendence in relation to it. However, in these authors we see that governing, the people who govern, and the practice of government, are multifarious since many people govern—the father of a family, the superior in a convent, the teacher, the master in relation to the child or disciple—so that there are many governments in relation to which the Prince governing his state is only one particular mode.* On the other hand, all these governments are internal to society itself, or to the state. It is within the state that the father governs his family, the superior governs the convent, and so on. There is then both a plurality of forms of government and the immanence of practices of government to the state, a multiplicity and immanence of this activity that radically distinguishes it from the transcendent singularity of Machiavelli's Prince.

Certainly, among all these forms of government that are caught up, intertwined, and tangled together within society and the state, there is a specific form that has to be identified, that of the government to be applied to the state as a whole. Thus, a bit later than La Perrière, in the following century, trying to produce a typology of different forms of government, François de La Mothe Le Vayer, in a series of pedagogical texts written for the French Dauphin, will say that there are basically three types of government, each of them falling under a science or particular form of reflection: the government of oneself, which falls under morality; the art of properly governing a family, which is part of economy; and finally, the "science of governing well" the state, which belongs to

* Foucault adds: whereas there is only one modality [some inaudible words] the principality, to be prince.

politics.¹⁹ It is quite clear that politics has its own particular character in comparison with morality and economy, and La Mothe Le Vayer points out that politics is not exactly economy or entirely morality. What is important here is that, notwithstanding this typology, these arts of government refer to and postulate an essential continuity from one to the other. Whereas the doctrine of the Prince or the juridical theory of the sovereign constantly try to make clear the discontinuity between the Prince's power and any other form of power, which involves explaining, asserting, and founding this discontinuity, in these arts of government one must try to identify both an upward and a downward continuity.

There is upward continuity in the sense that whoever wants to be able to govern the state must first know how to govern himself, and then, at another level, his family, his goods, his lands, after which he will succeed in governing the state. This kind of ascending line is typical of all the pedagogues of the Prince that are so important in this period, and of which La Mothe Le Vayer is an example. For the Dauphin, he first writes a book of morality, then a book of economy [...*], and finally a treatise of politics.²⁰ It is the education of the Prince, therefore, that will assure the upward continuity of the different forms of government. Then there is continuity in the opposite, downward direction in the sense that when a state is governed well, fathers will know how to govern their families, their wealth, their goods, and their property well, and individuals will also conduct themselves properly. This descending line, which means that the good government of the state affects individual conduct or family management, is what begins to be called "police" at this time. The education of the Prince assures the upward continuity of forms of government, and police assures their downward continuity.

In any case, you can see that the essential component, the central element in this continuity, both in the Prince's education and in police, is the government of the family, which is called precisely "economy." The art of government essentially appears in this literature as having to answer the question of how to introduce economy—that is to say, the proper way of managing individuals, goods, and wealth, like the management of a family by a father who knows how to direct his wife, his children, and

his servants, who knows how to make his family's fortune prosper, and how to arrange suitable alliances for it—how to introduce this meticulous attention, this type of relationship between father and the family, into the management of the state? The essential issue of government will be the introduction of economy into political practice. And if this is true in the sixteenth century, it is still the case in the eighteenth. In his article on "Political Economy," it is quite clear that Rousseau still poses the problem in the same terms, saying roughly: The word "economy" originally designates "the wise government of the house for the common good of the whole family."²¹ The problem, Rousseau says, is how to introduce this wise government of the family, *mutatis mutandis*, and with the discontinuities that we will note, within the general management of the state.²² To govern a state will thus mean the application of economy, the establishment of an economy, at the level of the state as a whole, that is to say, [exercising]* supervision and control over its inhabitants, wealth, and the conduct of all and each, as attentive as that of a father's over his household and goods.

An expression, that was important in the eighteenth century describes this very well. Quesnay speaks of good government as "economic government."²³ In Quesnay, and I will come back to this later, we find the moment [of birth][†] of this notion of economic government, which is basically tautological since the art of government is precisely to exercise power in the form, and according to the model, of economy. But if Quesnay says "economic government," the reason is that the word "economy," for reasons I shall try to elucidate shortly, is already beginning to acquire its modern meaning, and it is becoming apparent at this moment that the essence of this government, that is to say, of the art of exercising power in the form of economy, will have what we now call the economy as its principal object. The word "economy" designated a form of government in the sixteenth century; in the eighteenth century, through a series of complex processes that are absolutely crucial for our history, it will designate a level of reality and a field of intervention for government. So, there you have what is governing and being governed.

* M.F.: having

† Some words difficult to hear.

* Some inaudible words.

Second, still in Guillaume de La Perrière's text, there is the following [phrase]*: "Government is the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end."²⁴ I would like to make some further remarks with regard to this second sentence, different from those concerning the definition of the governor and of government. "Government is the right disposition of things": I would like to dwell a little on this word "things," because when we look for what characterizes the objects on which power bears in Machiavelli's *The Prince*, we see that the object, the target of power is, on the one hand, a territory, and, [on the other], its inhabitants. What's more, in this respect Machiavelli only takes up, for his own uses and for the specific ends of his analysis, the same juridical principle that characterized sovereignty in public law. From the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century, sovereignty is not exercised on things, but first of all on a territory, and consequently on the subjects who inhabit it. In this sense we can say that the territory really is the fundamental element both of Machiavelli's principality and of the juridical sovereignty of the sovereign as defined by philosophers or legal theorists. Obviously, these territories may be fertile or barren, they may be densely or sparsely populated, the people may be rich or poor, active or idle, but all these elements are only variables in relation to the territory that is the very foundation of the principality or of sovereignty.

Now we can see that in La Perrière's text the definition of government does not refer to the territory in any way: one governs things. What does La Perrière mean when he says that government governs "things"? I do not think it is a matter of an opposition between things and men, but rather of showing that government is not related to the territory, but to a sort of complex of men and things. The things government must be concerned about, La Perrière says, are men in their relationships, bonds, and complex involvements with things like wealth, resources, means of subsistence, and, of course, the territory with its borders, qualities, climate, dryness, fertility, and so on. "Things" are men in their relationships with things like customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking. Finally, they are men in their relationships with things like accidents, misfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death.

* M.F.: text

That government is concerned with things understood in this way as the intrication of men and things is readily confirmed by the inevitable metaphor of the ship that is always invoked in these treatises on government.²⁵ What is it to govern a ship? It involves, of course, being responsible for the sailors, but also taking care of the vessel and the cargo; governing a ship also involves taking winds, reefs, storms, and bad weather into account. What characterizes government of a ship is the practice of establishing relations between the sailors,* the vessel, which must be safeguarded, the cargo, which must be brought to port, and their relations with all those eventualities like winds, reefs, storms and so on. It is the same for a household. Governing a family is not fundamentally directed toward the aim of safeguarding the family property, but essentially means having the individuals who compose it, their wealth and prosperity, as the objective, the target; it means taking possible events, like deaths and births, into account; it means considering the things one can do, such as alliances with other families. It is this general management that is characteristic of government and in comparison with which the problem of landed property for the family, or of the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory for the Prince, are ultimately only relatively secondary elements. The essential, the main element, then, is this complex of men and things, the territory and property being only variables.

This theme in La Perrière's curious definition of government as the government of things is found again in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Frederick the Great has some illuminating pages on the subject in his *Anti-Machiavel*, when he says, for example: Compare Holland and Russia. Russia may well have the longest borders of any European state, but what does it consist of? It is mostly marshes, forests, and deserts; it is sparsely populated by bands of poor, miserable people who lack activity and industry. Holland, on the other hand, is quite small and also largely marshland, but Holland has such a population, wealth, commercial activity, and fleet as to ensure that it is an important country in Europe, which Russia is hardly beginning to become.²⁶ So, to govern means to govern things.

* Foucault adds: whom one must safeguard

I come back again to the text I quoted a moment ago, where La Perrière said: "Government is the right disposition of things that one arranges so as to lead them to a suitable end." Government therefore has a purpose, it arranges things, in the sense I have been talking about, and it arranges things [for an end]*. Here again I think government is very clearly distinguished from sovereignty. Of course, sovereignty is never presented in philosophical and juridical texts as a pure and simple right. Neither jurists, nor, a fortiori, theologians ever said that a legitimate sovereign was simply entitled to exercise his power, without further qualification. The sovereign, to be a good sovereign, must always propose an end, that is to say, as the texts regularly say, the common good and the salvation of all. For example, in a text from the end of the seventeenth century Pufendorf says: "Sovereign authority has only been conferred on them [these sovereigns; M.F.] in order that they make use of it to obtain and preserve the public utility [. . .]. A sovereign must on no account consider his own advantage, unless it be also advantageous for the state."²⁷ Now what does this common good, or this salvation of all, which is regularly invoked by jurists and theologians say when we speak of sovereignty, comprise? What do jurists and theologians say when we look at the real content that they give to this common good? They say that the common good exists when all subjects obey the law without fail, perform their appointed tasks well, practice the trades to which they are assigned, and respect the established order, insofar as this order conforms to the laws imposed by God on nature and men. That is to say, the public good is essentially obedience to the law, either to the earthly sovereign's law, or to the law of the absolute sovereign, God. In any case, what characterizes the end of sovereignty, this common or general good, is ultimately nothing other than submission to this law. This means that the end of sovereignty is circular; it refers back to the exercise of sovereignty. The good is obedience to the law, so that the good proposed by sovereignty is that people obey it. There is an essential circularity that, whatever its theoretical structure, moral justification, or practical effects, is not so far removed from Machiavelli saying that the Prince's main objective must be to preserve his principality; we always come

* Conjecture; words inaudible.

back to this circular relationship of sovereignty, or the principality, to itself.

Now, with La Perrière's new definition, with his search for a definition of government, I think we see the emergence of a new type of finality. Government is defined by La Perrière as a right way of arranging (*disposer*) things in order to lead (*conduire*) them, not to the form of the "common good," as the texts of the jurists said, but to a "suitable end," an end suitable for each of the things to be governed. This implies, first of all, a plurality of specific ends. For example, the government will have to ensure that the greatest possible amount of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, and that the population can increase. So, the objective of government will be a series of specific finalities. And one will arrange (*disposer*) things to achieve these different ends. This word "*disposer*" is important because, what enabled sovereignty to achieve its aim of obedience to the laws, was the law itself; law and sovereignty were absolutely united. Here, on the contrary, it is not a matter of imposing a law on men, but of the disposition of things, that is to say, of employing tactics rather than laws, or, of as far as possible employing laws as tactics; arranging things so that this or that end may be achieved through a certain number of means.

I think this marks an important break. Whereas the end of sovereignty is internal to itself and gets its instruments from itself in the form of law, the end of government is internal to the things it directs (*diriger*); it is to be sought in the perfection, maximization, or intensification of the processes it directs, and the instruments of government will become diverse tactics rather than laws. Consequently, law recedes; or rather, law is certainly not the major instrument in the perspective of what government should be. Here again we find the theme that recurs throughout the seventeenth century and is quite explicit in the eighteenth century texts of the *économistes* and physiocrats, which explain that the ends of government cannot be effectively achieved by means of the law.

Finally, a fourth remark or bearing taken on this text by Guillaume de La Perrière, but on a simple, elementary, and very quick point. La Perrière says that someone who knows how to govern well, a good governor, must possess "patience, wisdom, and diligence."²⁸ What does he mean by "patience"? Well, when he wants to explain the word

patience he takes the example of what he calls "the king of the honey bees," the bumblebee, and he says: The bumblebee reigns over the hive—this is not true, but it's not important—without need of a sting.²⁹ Through this, God wished to show, in a "mystical" way, he says, that the true governor should not need a sting, that is, a weapon for killing, a sword, in order to exercise his government. He must have patience rather than anger, and it is not the right to kill, to assert his strength, that should be essential in the figure of the governor. What positive content is to be given to this absence of a sting? It will be wisdom and diligence. The wisdom required of someone who governs is not exactly the wisdom of tradition, in the form of the knowledge of human and divine laws, of justice and equity, but rather wisdom as, precisely, the knowledge of things, of the objectives that can and must be attained, and the "disposition (*disposition*)" one must employ in order to attain them: this is the knowledge that constitutes the sovereign's wisdom. As for diligence, this is precisely what ensures that the sovereign, or rather one who governs, should govern only in a way such that he will consider himself and act as if he were in the service of those who are governed. Here again La Perrière refers to the example of the father: The father is someone who rises earlier than anyone else, who is the last to go to bed, and who watches over everything because he thinks of himself as being in the service of his household.³⁰

You can see straightaway how different this description of government is from the description of the Prince found, or thought to be found, in Machiavelli. For sure, despite some novel aspects, this notion of government is still very crude. I think that this first little sketch of the notion and theory of the art of government did not remain up in the air in the sixteenth century; it was not just a concern of political theorists. We can identify its correlations in reality. On the one hand, from the sixteenth century the theory of the art of government was linked to the development of the administrative apparatus of the territorial monarchies (the emergence of government apparatuses and relays, etcetera). It was also linked to a set of analyses and forms of knowledge that began to develop at the end of the sixteenth century and increased in scope in the seventeenth century; essentially knowledge of the state in its different elements, dimensions, and the factors of its strength, which was called,

precisely, "statistics," meaning science of the state.³¹ Finally, third, we cannot fail to link this search for an art of government with mercantilism and cameralism, which are efforts to rationalize the exercise of power, precisely in terms of the knowledge acquired through statistics, and also, at the same time, a doctrine, or rather a set of doctrinal principles concerning how to increase the power and wealth of the state. This art of government is not therefore just an idea of philosophers and advisors of the Prince; in fact it was only formulated insofar as the great apparatus of the administrative monarchy and its correlative forms of knowledge were being organized.

However, in truth, this art of government could not acquire its full scope and consistency before the eighteenth century. It remained imprisoned, as it were, within the forms of the administrative monarchy. There are, I think, a number of reasons why this art of government remained somewhat wrapped up in itself or, at any rate, the prisoner of structures [...]. First, this art of government was blocked for historical reasons, in the strict sense of the word "historical reason," which are easy to identify. Speaking in very broad terms, of course, I think this is quite simply the series of major crises of the seventeenth century: first, the Thirty Years War, with its devastation and ruin; second, [in the middle] of the century, the great peasant and urban uprisings; and finally, the financial crisis, as well as the crisis of means of subsistence, which weighed on the policy of all the Western monarchies at the end of the seventeenth century. Basically, the art of government could only spread, be reflected, and take on and increase its dimensions in a period of expansion free from the great military, economic, and political emergencies that plagued the seventeenth century from beginning to end.

So, massive, elementary historical reasons, if you like, blocked this art of government. I think that the art of government formulated in the sixteenth century was also blocked in the seventeenth century for other

* A few unintelligible words. All the preceding passage, from "which are efforts to . . ." is strangely missing from the transcription of the course published in *Dir et Ecriv* (see above, footnote at start of this lecture), p. 648, and is replaced by a paragraph of 19 lines of which there is no trace either in the recording or in the manuscript. [The same is true of the previous English translation of the Italian version published in *Aut-Aut*; see, *The Foucault Effect*, pp. 96-97; *Essential Writings*, 3, pp. 212-213; G.B.]

† Words difficult to hear. Manuscript: "which occupy all the middle of the century"

reasons, which could be called, in terms that I don't much care for, institutional and mental structures. At any rate, let's say that the pre-eminence of the problem of the exercise of sovereignty, both as a theoretical question and as a principle of organization, was a fundamental factor in blocking the art of government. So long as sovereignty was the major problem and the institutions of sovereignty were the fundamental institutions, and so long as the exercise of power was thought of as the exercise of sovereignty, the art of government could not develop in a specific and autonomous way, and I think that we have an example of this in, precisely, mercantilism. Mercantilism was the first effort, I was going to say the first sanctioned effort, of this art of government at the level of political practices and knowledge of the state; in this sense we can say that mercantilism is a first threshold of rationality in this art of government for which Perrière's text indicated only some moral rather than realistic principles. Mercantilism is the first rationalization of the exercise of power as a practice of government; it is the first time that a knowledge of the state began to be formed that can be employed for tactics of government. This is absolutely true, but I think that mercantilism was blocked and halted precisely because it took the sovereign's might as its essential objective: how to ensure not only that the country is rich, but that the sovereign has wealth and funds at his disposal, and can build up an army with which to pursue his policies? The objective of mercantilism is the might of the sovereign. What are its instruments? They are laws, edicts, and regulations, that is to say, the traditional weapons of sovereignty. Objective: sovereignty; instruments: those of sovereignty. Mercantilism tried to introduce the possibilities given by a reflected art of government within an institutional and mental structure of sovereignty that blocked it. Thus, throughout the seventeenth century, and until the great liquidation of mercantilist themes at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the art of government was marking time, as it were, trapped between two things. On the one hand, was the excessively large, abstract, and rigid framework of sovereignty as a problem and an institution. The art of government had tried to combine with the theory of sovereignty by trying to deduce the guiding principles of an art of government from a renewed theory of sovereignty. This is where the jurists of the seventeenth century intervene with the formulation or bringing

up to date of the theory of the contract. The theory of the contract—of the founding contract and the reciprocal commitment of sovereign and subjects—will be a kind of framework for bringing together the general principles of an art of government. But if the theory of the contract, this reflection on the relationships between the sovereign and his subjects, played a very important role in the theory of public law, [in reality]—and the example of Hobbes clearly shows this—notwithstanding the fact that ultimately it was looking for the guiding principles of an art of government, it always remained at the level of the formulation of general principles of public law.

So, the art of government was caught between an excessively large, abstract, and rigid framework of sovereignty on the one hand, and, on the other, a model of the family that was too narrow, weak, and insubstantial. The art of government either tried to join up with the general form of sovereignty, or—or rather, at the same time—it relied, and could not fail to rely, on the kind of complete model provided by the government of the family.^{32*} How can one ensure that the state can be governed as well, as precisely, and as meticulously as a family? And by the same token it was blocked by this idea of economy, which at that time only ever referred to the management of a small *ensemble* comprising the family and the household. With the household and father on the one hand, and the state and sovereignty on the other, the art of government could not find its own dimension.

How was the art of government released from this blocked situation? The process of its release, like the blockage itself, should be situated within a number of general processes: the demographic expansion of the eighteenth century, which was linked to the abundance of money, which was itself linked in turn to the expansion of agricultural production through circular processes with which historians are familiar and so will not be discussed here. This being the general framework, I think we can say more precisely that the unblocking of the art of government was

* The manuscript adds, p. 17: "For it is in fact the government of the family that best corresponds to the art of government that was sought: a power immanent to society (the father being part of the family), a power over 'things' rather than territory, a power with multiple finalities all of which concern the well-being, happiness, and wealth of the family, a peaceful, vigilant power."

to the emergence of the problem of population. Or, let's say that is a quite subtle process, which we should try to reconstruct in detail, in which we can see how the science of government, the re-focusing of the economy on something other than the family, and the problem of population are all interconnected. It is through the development of the science of government that the economy could be re-focused on a level of reality that we now describe as the economic; and it is again through the science of government that the specific problem of population could be identified. But we could also say that it is thanks to the perception of the specific problems of the population, and thanks to the isolation of the level of reality that we call the economy, that it was possible to think, reflect, and calculate the problem of government outside the juridical framework of sovereignty. And the same statistics, which, within the framework of mercantilism, had only ever been able to function within and, in a way, for the benefit of a monarchical administration that itself functioned according to the form of sovereignty, now becomes the main technical factor, or one of the main technical factors, in unblocking the art of government.

How in fact did the problem of population make possible the release of the art of government? The perspective of population, the reality of phenomena specific to population, makes it possible to eliminate the model of the family and to re-focus the notion of economy on something else. In fact, statistics, which had hitherto functioned within administrative frameworks, and so in terms of the functioning of sovereignty, now discovers and gradually reveals that the population possesses its own regularities: its death rate, its incidence of disease, its regularities of accidents. Statistics also shows that the population also involves specific, aggregate effects and that these phenomena are irreducible to those of the family: major epidemics, endemic expansions, the spiral of labor and wealth. Statistics [further] shows that, through its movements, its customs, and its activity, population has specific economic effects. Statistics enables the specific phenomena of population to be quantified and thereby reveals that this specificity is irreducible [to the] small framework of the family. Apart from some residual themes, such as moral or religious themes, the family disappears as the model of government.

On the other hand, the family now appears as an element within the population and as a fundamental relay in its government. In other

words, prior to the emergence of the problematic of population, the art of government could only be conceived on the basis of the model of the family, in terms of economy understood as management of the family. When, however, the population appears as absolutely irreducible to the family, the result is that the latter falls to a lower level than the population; it appears as an element within the population. It is therefore no longer a model; it is a segment whose privilege is simply that when one wants to obtain something from the population concerning sexual behavior, demography, the birth rate, or consumption, then one has to utilize the family. The family will change from being a model to being an instrument; it will become a privileged instrument for the government of the population rather than a chimerical model for good government. The shift from the level of model to that of instrument in relation to the population is absolutely fundamental. And in actual fact, from the middle of the eighteenth century, the family really does appear in this instrumental relation to the population, in the campaigns on mortality, campaigns concerning marriage, vaccinations, and inoculations, and so on. What enables population to unblock the art of government is that it eliminates the model of the family.

Second, population will appear above all as the final end of government. What can the end of government be? Certainly not just to govern, but to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health. And the instruments that government will use to obtain these ends are, in a way, immanent to the field of population; it will be by acting directly on the population itself through campaigns, or, indirectly, by, for example, techniques that, without people being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flows of population to this or that region or activity. Population, then, appears as the end and instrument of government rather than as the sovereign's strength: it is the subject of needs and aspirations, but also the object of government manipulation; vis-à-vis government, [population] is both aware of what it wants and unaware of what is being done to it. Interest as the consciousness of each of the individuals making up the population, and interest as the interest of the population, whatever the individual interests and aspirations may be of those who comprise the population, will be the ambiguous fundamental target and instrument

of the government of populations. This is the birth of an art, or anyway, of absolutely new tactics and techniques.

Finally, population will be the point around which what the sixteenth century texts called the "sovereign's patience" is organized. This means that the population will be the object that government will have to take into account in its observations and knowledge, in order to govern effectively in a rationally reflected manner. The constitution of a knowledge (*savoir*) of government is absolutely inseparable from the constitution of a knowledge of all the processes revolving around population in the wider sense of what we now call "the economy." Last week I said that the constitution of political economy was made possible when population emerged as a new subject from the different elements of wealth. Well, a new science called "political economy" and, at the same time, a characteristic form of governmental intervention, that is, intervention in the field of the economy and population, will be brought into being by reference to this continuous and multiple network of relationships between the population, the territory, and wealth.* In short, the transition from an art of government to political science,³³ the transition in the eighteenth century from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime dominated by techniques of government revolves around population, and consequently around the birth of political economy.

I am not saying that sovereignty ceased to play a role when the art of government becomes a political science. Rather, I would say that the problem of sovereignty was never more sharply posed than at this moment, precisely because it was no longer a question, as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of how to deduce an art of government from theories of sovereignty, but rather, given the existence and deployment of an art of government, what juridical form, what institutional form, and what legal basis could be given to the sovereignty typical of a state.

Read the two texts by Rousseau—the first, chronologically, is the article for the *Encyclopédie*, "Political economy"³⁴—and you can see how Rousseau poses the problem of government and of the art of government by noting (and the text is quite typical from this point of view) that the

word "economy" essentially designates the father's management of the family's goods;³⁵ but this model can no longer be accepted, even if it was valid in the past. We know, he says, that nowadays political economy is no longer family economy, and, without explicit reference to either the physiocrats or statistics, or to the general problem of population, he clearly registers this break and the fact that "economy," "political economy," has a completely new meaning that can no longer be reduced to the old model of the family.³⁶ At any rate, in this article he takes on the task of defining an art of government. Then he writes *The Social Contract*³⁷ in which the problem is how, with notions like those of "nature," "contract," and "general will," one can give a general principle of government that will allow for both the juridical principle of sovereignty and the elements through which an art of government can be defined and described. So sovereignty is absolutely not eliminated by the emergence of a new art of government that has crossed the threshold of political science. The problem of sovereignty is not eliminated; on the contrary, it is made more acute than ever.

As for discipline, this is not eliminated either. Obviously, its organization and deployment, and all the institutions within which it flourished in the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century—schools, workshops, armies—are part and parcel of, and can only be understood on the basis of, the development of the great administrative monarchies. But discipline was never more important or more valued than when the attempt was made to manage the population: managing the population does not mean just managing the collective mass of phenomena or managing them simply at the level of their overall results; managing the population means managing it in depth, in all its fine points and details.

Consequently, the idea of a government as government of population makes the problem of the foundation of sovereignty even more acute (and we have Rousseau) and it makes the need to develop the disciplines even more acute (and we have the history of the disciplines that I have tried to analyze elsewhere).³⁸ So we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management,

* The manuscript clarifies, p. 20: "Physiocrats: a science of government is a science of the relations between wealth and population."

which has population as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism. Anyway, I wanted to show you the profound historical link between the movement that overturns the constants of sovereignty consequent upon the major problem of good choices of government; the movement that reveals the population as a given, as a field of intervention, and as the end of government techniques; and, [finally,] the process that isolates the economy as a specific domain of reality, with political economy as both a science and a technique of intervention in this field of reality.* I think we should note that, from the eighteenth century, these three movements—government, population, political economy—form a solid series that has certainly not been dismantled even today.

I would like to add just one word [...]. Basically, if I had wanted to give the lectures I am giving this year a more exact title, I certainly would not have chosen "security, territory, population." What I would really like to undertake is something that I would call a history of "governmentality." By this word "governmentality" I mean three things. First, by "governmentality" I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by "governmentality" I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power—sovereignty, discipline, and so on—of the type of power that we can call "government" and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (*appareils*) on the one hand, [and, on the other]# to the development of a series of knowledges (*savoirs*). Finally, by "governmentality" I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the

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Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually "governmentalized."

We know the fascination that the love or horror of the state exercises today; we know our attachment to the birth of the state, to its history, advance, power, and abuses. I think this overvaluation of the problem of state is basically found in two forms. An immediate, affective, and tragic form is the lyricism of the cold monster³⁹ confronting us. But there is a second way of overvaluing the problem of the state that is paradoxical because apparently reductive. This analysis consists in reducing the state to a number of functions like, for example, the development of the productive forces and the reproduction of the relations of production. But this reductive view of the relative importance of the state in comparison with something else nonetheless makes the state absolutely essential as the target to be attacked and, as you well know, as the privileged position to be occupied. But the state, doubtless no more today than in the past, does not have this unity, individuality, and rigorous functionality, nor, I would go so far as to say, this importance. After all, maybe the state is only a composite reality and a mythicized abstraction whose importance is much less than we think. Maybe. What is important for our modernity, that is to say, for our present, is not then the state's takeover (*takeover*) of society, so much as what I would call the "governmentalization" of the state.

We live in the era of a governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century. Governmentalization of the state is a particularly contorted phenomenon, since if the problems of governmentality and the techniques of government have really become the only political stake and the only real space of political struggle and contestation, the governmentalization of the state has nonetheless been what has allowed the state to survive. And it is likely that if the state is what it is today, it is precisely thanks to this governmentality that is at the same time both external and internal to the state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state's domain, what is public and what private, what is and is not within the state's competence, and so on. So, if you like, the survival and limits of the state should be understood on the basis of the general tactics of governmentality.

And maybe, in a completely general, rough, and therefore inexact way, we could reconstruct the major forms, the major economies of

* The manuscript adds, p. 22: "the one [process] that will assure the management of populations by a body of functionaries."

Some untranslatable words follow.

* M.F.: the development also

power in the following way: first, the state of justice, born in a feudal type of territoriality and broadly corresponding to a society of customary and written law, with a whole interplay of commitments and litigations; second, the administrative state that corresponds to a society of regulations and disciplines; and finally, a state of government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, and, for sure, the territory it covers, but which is, in a way, only one of its components. This state of government, which essentially bears on the population and calls upon and employs economic knowledge as an instrument, would correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security.

There, if you like, are some remarks on the deployment of this, important I think, phenomenon of governmentality. I will now try to show you how this governmentality was born, [first], from the archaic model of the Christian pastorate and, second, by drawing support from a diplomatic-military model, or rather, technique, and finally, third, how it could only acquire its present dimensions thanks to a set of very specific instruments, the formation of which is exactly contemporaneous with the art of government, and which is called, in the old, seventeenth and eighteenth century sense of the word, police. I think the pastoral, the new diplomatic-military technique, and finally, police, were the three major points of support on the basis of which that fundamental phenomenon in the history of the West, the governmentalization of the state, could be produced.

1. On this tradition of the "mirrors of princes," see P. Hadot, "Fürstenspiegel" in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, vol. 8, ed. Th. Klauser (Stuttgart: A. Heisemann, 1972) col. 555-632.
2. N. Machiavelli, *Il Principe* (1513), (Rome: B. Di Giunna, 1932).
3. A. W. Rehberg, *Das Buch vom Fürsten von Niccolò Machiavelli*, übersetzt und mit Einleitung und Anmerkungen begleitet (Hanover, bei den Gebrüderm. Hahn, 1810; 2nd edn., Hanover: Hahnsche Hofbuchhandlung, 1824). See S. Bertelli and P. Innocenti, *Bibliografia machiavelliana* (Verona: Edizioni Valdonega, 1979) p. 206 and pp. 221-223.
4. Heinrich Leo published the first German translation of Machiavelli's informal letters in 1826, preceded by an introduction, *Die Briefe des Florentinischen Kanzlers und Geschichtsschreiber Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli an seine (Dummler, 1828)*. See G. Proccacci, *Machiavelli nella cultura europea dell'età moderna* (Bari: Laterza, 1995) pp. 385-386; S. Bertelli and P. Innocenti, *Bibliografia*, pp. 227-228.
5. Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886), *Zur Kritik neuerer Geschichtsschreiber* (Leipzig and Berlin: C. Reimer, 1824) pp. 182-202. In this work Ranke only devotes a brief but substantial appendix to Machiavelli (Proccacci). On its importance, see P. Villari, *Niccolò Machiavelli e i suoi tempi* (Milan: U. Hoepli, 1895) vol. 2, p. 463 sq.; G. Proccacci, *Machiavelli nella cultura europea*, pp. 383-384; "After Fichte, Ranke was the first among the German interpreters (do not forget that the Hegelian pages of the essay *Über Vorfassung Deutschlands* were still unpublished) to pose the problem of the unity of Machiavelli's work in a consistent way and to attempt to resolve it on a purely historical basis." See also, Friedrich Meinecke (1862-1954), *Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte* (Munich-Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1924); French translation by M. Chevallier, *L'idée de la raison d'État dans l'histoire des temps modernes* (Geneva: Droz, 1973) p. 343; English translation by Douglas Scott, *Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Reason d'État and its Place in Modern History* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1984) p. 380: "It is one of the most intelligent and fruitful estimates of Machiavelli that has ever been written, and it broke new ground for all those who followed him. Fifty years later, he supplemented it with additions which throw a particular light on the principles of his attitude towards Machiavelli, whereas the first edition was carried out purely from a historical point of view, and only hinted lightly at a moral judgment." This second edition appeared in 1874 and is reproduced in the *Samtliche Werke* (Leipzig, 1877) XXXIII-XXXIV, p. 151 sq.
6. This author is not cited in any bibliography. No trace of his name is found in the article by A. Elkann, "Die Entdeckung Machiavellis in Deutschland zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 119, 1919, pp. 427-458.
7. Angelo Ridolfi, *Penstieri intorno alla soppa di Niccolò Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe* (Milan: 1810). See G. Proccacci, *Machiavelli nella cultura europea*, pp. 374-377.
8. And not "in the United States" as in the Italian *Air-Air* version of the text (*Dis et Eris*, 3, p. 637) and the English version based on this.
9. Congress held at Vienna from November 1814 until June 1815 in order to establish a durable peace after the Napoleonic wars and to redraw the political map of Europe. This was the most important European congress since that of Westphalia in 1648. See below, lecture of 29 March 1978, note 9.
10. Lancelotto Politi (entered the Dominican order in 1517 under the name of Ambrogio Catarino), *Enarrationes R.P.F. Ambrosii Catharini Politi Senensis Archiepiscopi campani in quinque priora capitula libri Ceteris. Adlaunty plerique ad tractatus et quaestiones rerum variorum* (Rome: Antonium Bladum Cameræ apothecaræ typographum, 1552). According to Luigi Firpo, "La prima condanna del Machiavelli," Turin University of Studies, *Annuario dell'anno accademico 1966-67* (Turin, 1967) p. 28, the work could have been printed in 1548. The paragraph in this book entitled "Quam execrandi Machiavelli discursus & institutio sui principis" (pp. 340-344) immediately follows the paragraph in which the author deals with "de libris a Christiano destandis & a Christianismo penitus eliminandis" (p. 339)—not only pagan works, but also those of their imitators, such as Petrarch and Boccaccio. See G. Proccacci, *Machiavelli nella cultura europea*, pp. 89-91.
11. I. Gentillet, *Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner et maintenir en bonne paix un Royaume ou autre Principauté, divisé en trois parties à savoir du Conseil, de la Religion et Politiques, que doit tenir*

- 12. Frederick II (Frederick the Great) *Anti-Machiavel* (The Hague: 1740) is Voltaire's revised version of the *Réflexion du Prince* of Machiavelli written by the young heir to the Prussian throne in 1739, the text of which will only be published in 1848 (republished, Paris: Eyraud, "Corpus des œuvres de philosophie en langue française," 1985); English translation, *Anti-Machiavel: Or, an Examination of Machiavel's Prince. With notes historical and Political. Published by Mr. de Voltaire* (London: T. Woodward, MDCCXXII).
- 13. The first edition of Thomas Elyot's *The Boke Named the Governour* appeared in London and is actually dated 1531; critical edition ed. D.W. Rade (New York: Garland, 1992).
- 14. Paolo Paruta, *Della perfezione della vita politica* (Venice: D. Nicolini, 1579).
- 15. Guillaume de La Perrière (1499?-1553?), *Le Miroir politique, œuvre non moins utile que nécessaire à tous monarches, rois, princes, seigneurs, magistrats, et autres surintendants et gouverneurs de Républiques* (Lyons: Marc Bonhomme, 1555; 2nd edn., Paris: V. Normant and J. Brunneau, 1567; 3rd edn., Paris: Robert Le Magnier, 1567); English edition, *The Mirror of Polite* (London: Adam Islip, 1589 and 1599). See G. Dexter, "Guillaume de La Perrière," *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, XVIII (1), 1955, pp. 56-73; E. Sciacca, "Forme di governo e forma della società nel *Miroir Politique* di Guillaume de La Perrière," *Il Pensiero politico*, XXII, 1989, pp. 174-197. The posthumous work could have been written in 1539 on the request of the Toulouse *Capitolo*, who will ask the author to "compose in one volume, in suitable order, illustrating and enriching municipal edicts and statutes, concerning the act of political government" (3rd dedication, p. 9).
- 16. The last part of this sentence, from "notwithstanding the taste . . ." does not appear in the Italian *Anti-Aut* version [or English version; G.B.] of the text.
- 17. Title of the first Paris edition of 1567: *Le Miroir politique, contenant diverses manières de gouverner et polir les Républiques qui sont, et ont été par cy-devant, to which Foucault's citations refer. See above, note 15.*
- 18. G. de La Perrière, *Le Miroir politique*, folio p. 23r.
- 19. François de La Mothe Le Vayer (1588-1672), *L'Économique du Prince* (Paris: A. Courbé, 1653), reprinted in *Œuvres*, vol. 1, part II (Dresden: Michael Groell, 1756) pp. 287-288; "Morality, which is the science of conduct, is divided into three parts. In the first, which is called ethics, or morality par excellence, and on which your Majesty has already conversed, we learn to govern ourselves by the rules of reason. There are two other parts that naturally follow this, one of which is economic and the other political. This order is quite natural, since it is absolutely necessary that a man knows how to govern himself before commanding others, either as father of a family, which is economic, or as sovereign, magistrate, or minister of the State, which concerns politics." See also the prologue to *La Politique du Prince* in *Œuvres*, p. 299: "After the first two parts of morality, one teaching self-control and the other stewardship, that is to say conducting a family property, the third part, which is politics, or the science of governing well." These writings, composed between 1651 and 1658, are grouped together in the *Œuvres* of Le Vayer under the title *Science dont la connaissance peut devenir utile au Prince*. They make up the set of the *Instruction de Monseigneur Le Dauphin*, which dates from 1640. See, N. Chouhler-Myskowski, *L'Éducation du prince au XVII^e siècle d'après Henard et La Mothe Le Vayer* (Paris: Hathebe, 1976).
- 20. F. de La Mothe Le Vayer, *La Géographie et la Morale du Prince* (Paris: A. Courbé, 1651) [*Œuvres*, vol. 1, part II, pp. 3-174 for the first treatise and pp. 239-286 for the second]; *L'Économique du Prince. La Politique du Prince* (Paris: A. Courbé, 1653) [*Œuvres*, ibid., pp. 287-298 for the first treatise, and pp. 299-360 for the second].
- 21. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discours sur l'économie politique* (1755), in *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 3 (Paris: Callimard, "Bibliothèque de la Pléiade," 1964) p. 241; English translation by

- G.D.H. Cole, *A Discourse on Political Economy in The Social Contract and Discourses*, p. 128: "The word Economy, or Economy, is derived from oikos, a house, and vikos, law, and meant originally only the wise and legitimate government of the house for the common good of the whole family."
- 22. Ibid.: "The meaning of the term was then extended to the government of that great family, the State." A few lines later Rousseau notes that "the rules of conduct proper for one of these societies" would not be "also proper for the other. They differ too much in extent to be regulated in the same manner; and there will always be a great difference between domestic government, in which a father can see everything for himself, and civil government, where the chief sees hardly anything save through the eyes of others."
- 23. See, François Quesnay (1694-1774), *Maximes générales du gouvernement économique d'un royaume agricole*, in Du Pont de Nemours, ed., *Physiocratie ou Constitution naturelle du Gouvernement la plus avantageuse au genre humain* (Paris: Merlin, 1768) pp. 99-122; republished in F. Quesnay et la physiocratie, vol. 2, pp. 949-976. See above, lecture of 25 January, note 40.
- 24. G. de La Perrière, *Le Miroir politique*, folio 23r: "Gouvernement est droicte disposition des choses, desquelles on peut changer pour les conduire jusques à fin convenable."
- 25. On the classical use of this metaphor, see Plato, *Euthyphro*, 14b, *Protagoras*, 325c, *The Republic*, 389d, 488a-489d, 551c, 573d, *The Statesman*, 290c-291a, 297c, 301d, 302a, 304a, *The Laws*, 737a, 942b, 945c, 961c, etcetera (see P. Louis, *Les Métaphores de Platon* [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1945] p. 156); Aristotle, *Politics*, III, 4, 1276b, 20-30; Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, 3, 47; Thomas Aquinas *De regno*, I, 2, II, 3. In the next lecture Foucault returns to this metaphor on the basis of Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*.
- 26. Frederick II (the Great), *Anti-Machiavel* (Amsterdam: 1741); English, *Anti-Machiavel; or, an Examination of Machiavel's Prince*, commentary on chapter 5 of *The Prince*, pp. 17-19, Foucault probably used the Garnier edition of the text, published after Machiavelli's *The Prince* by R. Naves, 1941, pp. 117-118. See also the critical edition of the work by C. Fleischauer in, *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* (Geneva: E. Droz, 1958) vol. 5, pp. 199-200. Foucault's paraphrase is, however, inexact: Frederick the Great did not say Russia was made up of marshes, etcetera, but of land that "produces all sorts of corn."
- 27. Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694), *De officio hominis et civis iuxta Legem naturalem* (ad Jungians, Londini Scanorum 1673) Book II, ch. 11, § 3; French translation, *Les Devoirs de l'homme et du citoyen tels qu'ils sont prescrits par la loi naturelle*, trans. J. Barbeyrac (Amsterdam: Pierre du Coup, 1718, 4th edn.) vol. 1, pp. 361-362; English translation by Michael Silverthorne, *On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law*, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 151: "This is the general rule for sovereigns: the safety of the people is the supreme law. For authority has been given them to achieve the end for which states were instituted. Princes must believe that nothing is good for them privately which is not good for the state." [The French translation of this passage is a bit different: "The good of the people is the sovereign law: it is also the general maxim that sovereigns [Princes] must keep constantly in mind, since Sovereign authority has only been conferred on them in order that they make use of it to obtain and preserve the public utility that is the natural end of the establishment of civil societies. A sovereign therefore must on no account hold to what is to his own advantage, unless he be also advantageous for the State"; G.B.]; see also, *De jure naturæ et gentium* (Lund: A. Jungians, 1672) VII, IX, § 3; French translation by J. Barbeyrac, *Le Droit de la nature et des gens, ou Système général des principes les plus importants de la Morale, de la Jurisprudence et de la Politique*, trans. J. Barbeyrac (Amsterdam: H. Scheele and J. Knyper, 1706); English translation by Basil Kennet and others, *Of the Law of Nature and Nations* (Oxford: 1703).
- 28. G. de La Perrière, *Le Miroir politique*, f. 23r: "Every governor of a Kingdom or Republic must possess in himself wisdom, patience, and diligence."
- 29. Ibid. f. 23r: "Every governor must also have patience, following the example of the King of the honey bees, who has no sting at all, by which nature wanted to show mystically that Kings and governors of Republics must employ much more clemency than severity towards their subjects, and more equity than harshness."
- 30. Ibid.: "What must a good governor of a Republic possess? He must have extreme diligence in the government of his city, and if the good father (in order to be a good steward, that is

- to say head of the household) must be the first to rise and the last to go to bed in his private household, what must the governor do in a city in which there are several households, and the King in the Kingdom of several cities?"
31. On the history of statistics, see the classical work of V. John, *Geschichte der Statistik* (Stuttgart: F. Encke, 1884), reference to which appears in Foucault's notes. He may also have been familiar with the volume published by the INSEE, *Pour une histoire de la statistique* (Paris: INSEE, 1977; republished, Paris: Ed. Economica/INSEE, 1987).
32. See, for example, Richelieu, *Testament politique* (Amsterdam: H. Desbordes, 1688); ed., L. André (Paris: R. Laffont, 1947) p. 279: "Private families are the true models of Republics."
33. See the subtitle of the book on cameralism by P. Schiera, *Il Cameralismo e l'assolutismo tedesco: Dall'Arte di Governo alle Scienze dello Stato* (Milan: A. Giuffrè, 1968). Foucault never cites this book, which marks a milestone in the recent history of *Polizienwissenschaften*, but he probably knew of it, at least indirectly, through Pasquale Pasquino, who was then very close to him. Foucault comes back to the word "science," which he rejects, at the start of the next lecture.
34. See above, note 21.
35. See, *ibid.*
36. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discours sur l'économie politique*, p. 241 and p. 244: "A Discourse on Political Economy, p. 128 and p. 131. "But how could the government of the State be like that of the family, when the basis on which they rest is so different? (...). From all that has just been said, it follows that public economy, which is my subject, has been rightly distinguished from private economy, and that, the State having nothing in common with the family except the obligations which their heads lie under of making both of them happy, the same rules of conduct cannot apply to both."
37. *Du Contrat social, ou Principe du droit politique* (Amsterdam: M. Key, 1762).
38. See *Surveiller et Punir: Discipline and Punish*.
39. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969) p. 75: "The state is the coldest of all cold monsters [das kälteste aller kalten Ungestalten]. Coldly it lies, too; and this lie creeps from its mouth: 'I, the state, am the people.'" Nietzsche's expression is frequently taken up in anarchist discourse.

five

8 FEBRUARY 1978

Why study governmentality? ~ The problem of the state and population. ~ Reminder of the general project: triple displacement of the analysis in relation to (a) the institution, (b) the function, and (c) the object. ~ The stake of this year's lectures. ~ Elements for a history of "government." Its semantic field from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century. ~ The idea of the government of men. Its sources: (A) The organization of a pastoral power in the pre-Christian and Christian East. (B) Spiritual direction (direction de conscience). ~ First outline of the pastorate. Its specific features: (a) it is exercised over a multiplicity on the move; (b) it is a fundamentally beneficent power with salvation of the flock as its objective; (c) it is a power which individualizes. Omnes et singulatum. The paradox of the shepherd (Berger). ~ The institutionalization of the pastorate by the Christian Church.

I MUST APOLOGIZE, BECAUSE I will be more muddled than usual today I've got the flu and don't feel very well. I was bothered all the same, since I had some misgivings about letting you come here and then telling you at the last minute that you could leave again. So, I will talk for as long as I can, but you must forgive me for the quantity as well as the quality. I would like to begin to go over the dimension that I have called by the ugly word "governmentality."* Assuming that "governing" is different

* In inverted commas in the manuscript.

from "reigning or ruling," and not the same as "commanding," or "laying down the law," or being a sovereign, suzerain, lord, judge, general, landowner, master, or a teacher, assuming therefore that governing is a specific activity, we now need to know something about the type of power the notion covers. In short, we need to analyze the relations of power on which the sixteenth century arts of government set their sights, which are also the target of seventeenth century mercantilist theory and practice, and which, finally, are the aim—and maybe reach a certain threshold of, I think last week I said science,¹ but this is a thoroughly bad and disastrous word: let's say a certain level of political competence—in, broadly speaking, the physiocratic doctrine of "economic government."²

First question: Why should one want to study this insubstantial and vague domain covered by a notion as problematic and artificial as that of "governmentality"? My immediate answer will be, of course, in order to tackle the problem of the state and population. Straightaway there is a second question: This is all very well, but we know what the state and population are, or, at any rate, we think we do. The notions of the state and of the population have their definitions and histories. Broadly speaking, we are more or less familiar with the domain to which these notions refer, or anyway, if there is a submerged or obscure part, there is another visible part. So, since it involves studying this, at best, or worst, semi-obscure domain of the state and population, why should one want to approach it through such a thoroughly obscure notion as that of "governmentality"? Why attack the strong and the dense with the feeble, diffuse, and lacunary?

Well, I will give you the reason in a few words and by recalling a somewhat more general project. When in previous years we talked about the disciplines, about the army, hospitals, schools, and prisons, basically we wanted to carry out a triple displacement, shifting, if you like, to the outside, and in three ways. First, moving outside the institution, moving off-center in relation to the problematic of the institution or what could be called the "institutional-centric" approach. Consider the example of the psychiatric hospital. For sure, we can start from the psychiatric hospital as it is given in its structure and institutional density and try to discover its internal structures, to identify the logical necessity of each of

its constituent components, and to show what type of medical power is organized within it and how it develops a certain psychiatric knowledge. But—and here I refer specifically to Robert Castel's clearly fundamental and essential work, *L'Ordre psychiatrique*,³ which really should be read—we can proceed from the outside, that is to say, show how the hospital can only be understood as an institution on the basis of something external and general, that is, the psychiatric order, precisely insofar as the latter is connected up with an absolutely global project, which we can broadly call public hygiene, which is directed towards society as a whole.⁴ As Castel does, we can show how the psychiatric institution gives concrete expression to, intensifies, and gives density to a psychiatric order rooted in the definition of a non-contractual regime for individuals reduced to the status of minors.⁵ Finally, we can show how a whole battery of multifarious techniques concerning the education of children, assistance to the poor, and the institution of workers' tutelage are coordinated through this psychiatric order.⁶ This kind of method entails going behind the institution and trying to discover in a wider and more overall perspective what we can broadly call a technology of power. In the same way, this analysis allows us to replace a genetic analysis through filiation with a genealogical analysis—genealogy should not be confused with genesis and filiation—which reconstructs a whole network of alliances, communications, and points of support. So, the first methodological principle is to move outside the institution and replace it with the overall point of view of the technology of power.⁷

The second shift, the second transfer to the outside, concerns the function. Take the case of the prison, for example. We could of course analyze the prison on the basis of the functions we expect it to perform, those defined as its ideal functions, and of the optimal way of exercising them (which is, broadly speaking, what Bentham did in his *Panopticon*⁸). Starting from there, we could see what real functions were assured by the prison and establish an historical balance sheet of functional pluses and minuses, or anyway of what was intended and what was actually achieved. But, here again, studying the prison from the angle of the disciplines involved short-circuiting, or rather moving outside in relation to the functional point of view, and putting the prison back in a general economy of power. As a result, we noticed that the real

history of the prison is undoubtedly not governed by the successes and failures of its functionality, but is in fact inserted within strategies and tactics that find support even in these functional defects themselves. So, the second principle is to substitute the external point of view of strategies and tactics for the internal point of view of the function.

Finally, the third de-centering, the third shift to the outside, concerns the object. Taking the point of view of the disciplines involved refusing to give oneself a ready-made object, be it mental illness, delinquency, or sexuality. It involved not seeking to measure institutions, practices, and knowledge in terms of the criteria and norms of an already given object. Instead, it involved grasping the movement by which a field of truth with objects of knowledge was constituted through these mobile technologies. We can certainly say that madness "does not exist,"^{9*} but this does not mean it is nothing. All in all, it was a matter of doing the opposite of what phenomenology had taught us to say and think, the phenomenology that said, roughly: Madness exists, which does not mean that it is a thing.¹⁰

In short, the point of view adopted in all these studies involved the attempt to free relations of power from the institution, in order to analyze them from the point of view of technologies; to distinguish them also from the function, so as to take them up within a strategic analysis, and to detach them from the privilege of the object, so as to resituate them within the perspective of the constitution of fields, domains, and objects of knowledge. If this triple movement of a shift to the outside was tried out with regard to the disciplines, I would now like to explore this possibility with regard to the state. Can we cross over to the outside of the state as we could, without great difficulty, with regard to these different institutions? Is there an encompassing point of view with regard to the state as there was with regard to local and definite institutions? I think this type of question cannot fail to arise, be it only as the result, the necessity implied by precisely what I have just been saying. After all, do not these general technologies of power, which we have attempted to reconstruct by moving outside the institution, ultimately fall under a global, totalizing institution that is, precisely, the state?

* In inverted commas in the manuscript.

By stepping outside these local, regional, and precise institutions of the hospital, the prison, or families, are we not referred back, quite simply, to another institution, so that we will have abandoned institutional analysis only to be enjoined to enter into another type of institutional analysis in which, precisely, the state is the stake? It is all very well to emphasize confinement, for example, as a general procedure that enveloped the history of psychiatry; but in the end is not confinement a typical operation of the state, or one that broadly falls under the action of the state? We may well single out the disciplinary mechanisms of sites such as the prison, workshops, and the army, where there were attempts to put these mechanisms to work. But, in the last instance, is not the state ultimately responsible for their general and local application? It may be that the extra-institutional, non-functional, and non-objective generality of the analysis I have been talking about confronts us with the totalizing institution of the state.*

* No doubt due to the fatigue that he refers to at the start of the lecture, Foucault leaves out the exposition of pages 8 to 12 of the manuscript.

⁹Hence the second reason for raising the question of the state: is not the method of analyzing localized powers in terms of procedures, technologies, tactics, and strategies just a way of passing from one level to another, from the micro to the macro? And consequently, would it not have only provisional value: for the stage of this transition? It is true that no method should be a stake in itself. A method should be made in order to get rid of it. But it is less a question of method than of point of view, of an adaptation of the gaze: a way of turning round the [support] of things by moving the person observing them. Now it seems to me that such a shift produces effects that are at least worth maintaining for as long as one can, if not holding on to them at any price.

¹⁰What are these effects?
a. By de-institutionalizing and de-functionalizing relations of power we can grasp their genealogy, i.e., the way they are formed, connect up with each other, develop, multiply, and that are transformed on the basis of something other than themselves, on the basis of processes that are something other than relations of power. Example of the army. We may say that the disciplinarization of the army is due to its control by the state (*titulation*). However, when disciplinarization is connected, [not] with a concentration of state control, but with the problem of floating populations, the importance of commercial networks, technical inventions, models [several illegible words] community management, a whole network of alliance, support, and communication constitutes the "genealogy" of military discipline. Not the power from one institution to another, it is by grasping them at the point where they constitute techniques with operative value in multiple processes.

b. By de-institutionalizing and de-functionalizing relations of power we can [see] the respect in which and why they are unstable.
—Remnability to a whole series of different processes. Technologies of power are not immobile: they are not rigid structures aiming to immobilize living processes by their very immobility. Technologies of power are endlessly modified by the action of numerous factors. And when an institution breaks down it is not necessarily because the power that underpins

So, in short, the challenge of the lectures I would like to give this year will be this. Just as in the examination of the relationships between reason and madness in the modern West we tried to question the general procedures of confinement and segregation, thus going behind the asylum, the hospital, therapies, and classifications,* and just as for the prison we tried to go behind penitentiary institutions in the strict sense so as to seek out the general economy of power, can we carry out the same reversal for the state? Is it possible to move outside? Is it possible to place the modern state in a general technology of power that assured its mutations, development, and functioning? Can we talk of something like a "governmentality" that would be to the state what techniques of segregation were to psychiatry, what techniques of discipline were to the penal system, and what biopolitics was to medical institutions? These are the kind of questions that are at stake [in these lectures].[†]

So, this notion of government. A bit of orientation in the history of the word, in a period in which it had not yet acquired the political, rigorous statist meaning, it begins to take on in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. What do we get from looking at some historical dictionaries of the French language?[‡] We see that in the thirteenth,

it has been put out of play. It may be because it has become incompatible with some fundamental mutations of these technologies. Example of penal reform (neither popular revolt, nor even extra-popular pressure).

—But also accessibility to struggles or attacks that inevitably find their theater in the institution.

This means that it is entirely possible to arrive at overall effects, not by concerted confrontations, but also by local or lateral or diagonal attacks that bring into play the general economy of the whole. Thus: marginal spiritual movements, multiplicities of religious dissidence, which did not in any way attack the Catholic Church, ultimately topped not only a whole section of the ecclesiastical institution, but the way in which religious power was exercised in the West.

These theoretical and practical effects suggest that it may be worth the effort to continue with experiment.[§]

* The manuscript adds here (p. 13): "just as to examine the status of illness and the privileges of medical knowledge in the modern world it was also necessary to go behind the hospital and medical institutions in order to attempt to connect up with the general procedures for taking charge of life and illness in the West, with biopolitics."

† Handwritten words. Foucault adds: I would now like to, in order to excuse the character [an

inadmissible word] of what I am trying to say to you between two fits of coughing...

‡ The manuscript contains this complementary note: "NB. I am not saying that the state was born from the art of government, or that the techniques for governing men were born in the seventeenth century. The state as the set of institutions of sovereignty has existed for millennia. The techniques of the government of men also existed for millennia. But it is on the basis of a new general technology [of] the government of men that the state took the form that we know."

fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries the word "to govern (*gouverner*)" actually covers a considerable number of different meanings. First, we find the purely material, physical, and spatial meaning, of to direct, move forward, or even to move forward oneself on a track, a road. "To govern" is to follow a path, or put on a path. In Froissart, for example, you find a text like this: "A [...] path so narrow that [...] two men *ne s'y pourraient gouverner*,"¹² that is to say, could not go forward walking abreast. It also has the material but much wider meaning of supporting by providing means of subsistence. For example, in a text from 1421: "enough wheat to govern (*gouverner*) Paris for two years,"¹³ or again, from the same period: "a man did not have the wherewithal to live or govern (*gouverner*) his wife who was ill."¹⁴ So, "to govern" in the sense of support, provide for, and give means of subsistence. "A wife of excessive government (*gouvernement*)"¹⁵ is a wife who consumes too much and is difficult to support. "To govern" also has a meaning close to this, but a little different, of the source of one's means of subsistence. Froissart talks of a town "which is governed (*se gouverner*) by its drapery,"¹⁶ that is to say, getting its means of subsistence from this activity. These are a set of reference points, or some specifically material references anyway, of this word "to govern (*gouverner*)."

There are meanings of a moral kind. "To govern" may mean "to conduct someone," either in the specifically spiritual sense of the government of souls—a completely classical sense that will endure and subsist for a very long time—or, in a way that deviates a bit from this, "to govern" may mean "to impose a regimen," on a patient for example: the doctor governs the patient, or the patient, who imposes treatment on himself, governs himself. Thus, a text says: "A patient who, after having left the Hôtel-Dieu, passed away as a result of his bad government."¹⁷

He had followed a bad regimen. "To govern," or "government," may refer to conduct in the specifically moral sense of the term: a daughter who was of "bad government,"¹⁸ that is to say, whose conduct was bad. "To govern" may refer also to a relationship between individuals that can take many forms, be it the relationship of command and control—directing, dealing with someone—or having a verbal relationship with someone: "governing someone" may mean "speaking with him," "conversing with him" in the sense of holding someone in a conversation. Thus, a text from the fifteenth century says: "He ate well with all those who conversed

with him (*le gouvernement*) during his supper.¹⁹ To govern (*gouverner*) someone during his supper is to speak with him. But it may also refer to a sexual relationship: "A fellow who had a sexual relationship with (*gouvernait*) the wife of his neighbor, and saw her regularly."²⁰

This is both a very empirical and unscientific set of reference points established through dictionaries and various references. All the same, I think it allows us to situate one of the dimensions of the problem. Before it acquires its specifically political meaning in the sixteenth century, we can see that "to govern," covers a very wide semantic domain in which it refers to movement in space, material subsistence, diet, the care given to an individual and the health one can assure him, and also to the exercise of command, of a constant, zealous, active, and always benevolent prescriptive activity. It refers to the control one may exercise over oneself and others, over someone's body, soul, and behavior. And finally it refers to an intercourse, to a circular process or process of exchange between one individual and another. Anyway, one thing clearly emerges through all these meanings, which is that one never governs a state, a territory, or a political structure. Those whom one governs are people, individuals, or groups. When one speaks of a town that governs itself (*se gouverne*), and which is governed on the basis of its drapery, it means that people get their means of subsistence, their food, their resources, and their wealth from drapery. It is not therefore the town as a political structure, but the people, individuals, or group. Those whom one governs are people.*

I think this may put us on the track of something that is undoubtedly of some importance. To start with, and fundamentally, at least through this first set of references, those whom one governs are people. Now the idea of governing people is certainly not a Greek idea, and nor do I think it is a Roman idea. In Greek literature at least, there is the fairly frequent metaphor of the rudder, the helmsman, the pilot, and the person who steers the ship, to designate the activity of the person who is the head of the city-state and who has a number of duties and responsibilities with regard to the city. Take, for example, *Oedipus the King*.²¹ In *Oedipus the*

King, frequently, or at several points, there is the metaphor of the king who is responsible for the city-state and must conduct it as a good pilot properly governs his ship, avoiding reefs and guiding it to port.²² But in these metaphors, which identify the king as a helmsman and the city as a ship, we should note that what is governed, what the metaphor designates as the object of government, is the city-state itself, which is like a ship threatened by reefs, a ship caught in the storm, a ship that has to steer a course avoiding pirates and enemies, and a ship that must be led to safe harbor. Individuals are not the object of government; the action of government is not brought to bear on individuals. The captain or pilot of the ship does not govern the sailors; he governs the ship. In the same way, the king governs the city-state, but not the men of the city. The object or target of government is the city-state in its substantial reality, its unity, and its possible survival or disappearance. Men are only governed indirectly, insofar as they have boarded the ship. And men are governed through the intermediary or relay of boarding the ship. But it is not men themselves who are directly governed by the person who is the head of the city-state.*

So I do not think that the idea that one could govern men, or that one did govern men, was a Greek idea. If I have the time and courage I will come back to this problem, either at the end of these lectures or in the next series of lectures, basically around Plato and *The Statesman*. But, generally speaking, I think we can say that the origin of the idea of a government of men should be sought in the East, in a pre-Christian East first of all, and then in the Christian East, and in two forms: first, in the idea and organization of a pastoral type of power, and second, in the practice of spiritual direction, the direction of souls.

First, the idea and organization of a pastoral power. The theme of the king, god, or chief as a shepherd (*berger*) of men, who are like his flock, is frequently found throughout the Mediterranean East. It is found in Egypt,²³ Assyria,²⁴ Mesopotamia,²⁵ and above all, of course, in the Hebrews. In Egypt, for example, but also in the Assyrian and Babylonian

* The manuscript adds: "History of governmentality. Three major vectors of the governmentalization of the state: the Christian pastoral = old model; the new regime of diplomatic-military relations = supporting structure; the problem of the internal police of the state = internal support." See above, the last lines of the previous lecture, 1 February.

* The manuscript adds, p. 16: "This does not exclude there being those among the rich and powerful who had a status that allowed them to manage the affairs of the city-state, and allowed others (citizens, not slaves or metics) multiple and closely woven modes of action: clientelism, engelement."

monarchies, the king is actually designated, in a completely ritual way, as the shepherd (*berger*) of men. On his coronation, for example, the Pharaoh receives the insignia of the shepherd. The shepherd's crook is placed in his hands and he is declared the shepherd of men. The title of shepherd (*pâtr*) or pastor (*pasteur*) of men, is one of the royal titles for the Babylonian monarchs. It was also a term designating the relationship of the gods, or god, with men. God is the pastor of men. In an Egyptian hymn, we can read something like this: "Oh Ra who keeps watch when all men sleep, who seeks what is good for your flock. . . ."²⁶ God is the shepherd (*berger*) of men. In a word, this metaphor of the shepherd, this reference to pastorship allows a type of relationship between God and the sovereign to be designated, in that if God is the shepherd of men, and if the king is also the shepherd of men, then the king is, as it were, the subaltern shepherd to whom God has entrusted the flock of men and who, at the end of the day and the end of his reign, must restore the flock he has been entrusted with to God. Pastorship is a fundamental type of relationship between God and men and the king participates, as it were, in this pastoral structure of the relationship between God and men. An Assyrian hymn addressed to the king says: "Radiant companion who shares in God's pastorship (*pastorat*), who cares for the land and provides for it, O shepherd of plenty!"²⁷

Obviously, the theme of pastorship is especially developed and intensified in the Hebrews,²⁸ with the particular characteristic that in the Hebrews the shepherd-flock relationship is essentially, fundamentally, and almost exclusively a religious relationship. Only the relations between God and his people are defined as relations between a shepherd (*pasteur*) and a flock. No Hebrew king, with the exception of David, the founder of the monarchy, is explicitly referred to by name as a shepherd (*berger*).²⁹ The term is reserved for God.³⁰ But some prophets are thought to have received the flock of men from God, to whom they must return it;³¹ and, on the other hand, the bad kings, those who are denounced for having betrayed their task, are designated as bad shepherds, not in relation to individuals, but always in reference to the whole, as those who have squandered and dispersed the flock, who have been unable to feed it and take it back to its land.³² The pastoral relationship in its full and positive form is therefore essentially the

relationship of God to men. It is a religious type of power that God exercises over his people.

I think there is something in this that is fundamental, and probably specific, to the Mediterranean East, and which is very different from what is found in the Greeks. You never find the Greeks having the idea that the gods lead men like a pastor, a shepherd, leads his flock. Whatever the intimacy between the Greek gods and their city, and it is not necessarily very great, it is never that kind of relationship. The Greek god founds the city, he or she indicates its site, helps in the construction of walls, guarantees its soundness, gives his or her name to the town, and issues oracles through which he or she gives advice. The god is consulted; he or she protects and intervenes; he or she is sometimes angry, and then makes peace; but the Greek god never leads the men of the city like a shepherd leads his sheep.

What is it, then, that characterizes this power of the shepherd, which we can see is foreign to Greek thought, but present and intense in the Mediterranean East, especially in the Hebrews? What are its specific features? I think we can summarize them in the following way. The shepherd's power is not exercised over a territory but, by definition, over a flock, and more exactly, over the flock in its movement from one place to another. The shepherd's power is essentially exercised over a multiplicity in movement. The Greek god is a territorial god, a god *intra muros*, with his privileged place, his town or temple. The Hebrew God, on the other hand, is the God moving from place to place, the God who wanders. The presence of the Hebrew God is never more intense and visible than when his people are on the move, and when, in his people's wanderings, in the movement that takes them from the town, the prairies, and pastures, he goes ahead and shows his people the direction they must follow. The Greek god, rather, appears on the walls to defend his town. The Hebrew God appears precisely when one is leaving the town, when one is leaving the city walls behind and taking the path across the prairies. "O God, when you set out at the head of your people," say the Psalms.³³ In the same way, or in a somewhat similar way, Amnon, the Egyptian shepherd-god, is defined as the one who leads people on every path. If there is a reference to the territory in the direction God gives to a multiplicity on the move, it is to where the shepherd-god

knows fertile grasslands can be found, the best routes to take, and the places suitable for resting. In Exodus, it is said to Yahweh: "In your faithful love you led out the people you had redeemed; in your strength you have guided them to your holy pastures."^{32*} So, in contrast with the power exercised on the unity of a territory, pastoral power is exercised on a multiplicity on the move.

Second, pastoral power is fundamentally a beneficent power. You will say that this is part of all religions, moral, and political descriptions of power. What kind of power would be fundamentally wicked? What kind of power would not have the function, purpose, and justification of doing good? It is a universal feature, except that, nonetheless, in Greek thought anyway, and I think also in Roman thought, the duty to do good was ultimately only one of the many components characterizing power. Power is characterized as much by its omnipotence, and by the wealth and splendor of the symbols with which it clothes itself, as by its beneficence. Power is defined by its ability to triumph over enemies, defeat them, and reduce them to slavery. Power is also defined by the possibility of conquest and by the territories, wealth, and so on it has accumulated. Beneficence is only one of a whole bundle of features by which power is defined.

However, pastoral power is, I think, entirely defined by its beneficence; its only *raison d'être* is doing good, and in order to do good. In fact the essential objective of pastoral power is the salvation (*salut*)[†] of the flock. In this sense we can say that we are assuredly not very far from the objective traditionally fixed for the sovereign, that is to say, the salvation of one's country, which must be the *lex suprema* of the exercise of power.³⁵ But the salvation that must be assured to the flock has a very precise meaning in this theme of pastoral power. Salvation is first of all essentially subsistence. The means of subsistence provided, the food assured,

* Foucault's French version of this verse is slightly different from the King James version: "thou has guided them in thy strength unto thy holy habitation," and from that of the New Jerusalem Bible: "In your strength you have guided them to your holy dwelling"; G.B.]

† The French *salut* can, of course, mean both "safety" and "salvation" in its religious sense. I have chosen to translate it as salvation, bearing in mind that the English word, in addition to the specifically religious sense, also includes the sense of preserving from harm, whereas "safety" does not include the religious sense. G.B.

is good pasture. The shepherd is someone who feeds and who feeds directly, or at any rate, he is someone who feeds the flock first by leading it to good pastures, and then by making sure that the animals eat and are properly fed. Pastoral power is a power of care. It looks after the flock, it looks after the individuals of the flock, it sees to it that the sheep do not suffer, it goes in search of those that have strayed off course, and it treats those that are injured. A rabbinic commentary, which is a bit late but which absolutely reflects this, explains how and why Moses was chosen by God to lead the flock of Israel. It was because when Moses was a shepherd in Egypt he knew how to graze his sheep and knew, for example, that when he came to pasture he had to send the youngest sheep first to eat the most tender grass, then those a little older, and then the eldest and most robust who could eat the toughest grass. In this way each category of sheep had the grass it needed and enough to eat. Moses presided over this just, calculated, and reflected distribution of food, and Yahweh, seeing this, said to him: "Since you know how to pity the sheep, you will have pity for my people, and I will entrust them to you."³⁶

The shepherd's (*pasteur*) power manifests itself, therefore, in a duty, a task to be undertaken, so that—and I think this is also an important characteristic of pastoral power—the form it takes is not first of all the striking display of strength and superiority. Pastoral power initially manifests itself in its zeal, devotion, and endless application. What is the shepherd (*berger*)? Is he someone whose strength strikes men's eyes, like the sovereigns or gods, like the Greek gods, who essentially appear in their splendor? Not at all. The shepherd is someone who keeps watch. He "keeps watch" in the sense, of course, of keeping an eye out for possible evils, but above all in the sense of vigilance with regard to any possible misfortune. He will keep watch over the flock and avoid the misfortune that may threaten the least of its members. He will see to it that things are best for each of the animals of his flock. This is true for the Hebrew God and equally for the Egyptian god, of whom it is said: "Oh Ra who keeps watch when all men sleep, who seeks what is beneficial for your flock..."³⁷ But why? He keeps watch because he has an office, which is not primarily defined as an honor, but rather as a burden and effort. The shepherd (*pasteur*) directs all his care towards

others and never towards himself. This is precisely the difference between the good and the bad shepherd. The bad shepherd only thinks of good pasture for his own profit, for fattening the flock that he will be able to sell and scatter, whereas the good shepherd thinks only of his flock and of nothing else. He does not even consider his own advantage in the well-being of his flock. I think we see here the appearance, the outline, of a power with an essentially selfless and, as it were, transitional character. The shepherd (*pasteur*) serves the flock and must be an intermediary between the flock and pasture, food, and salvation, which implies that pastoral power is always a good in itself. All the dimensions of terror and of force or fearful violence, all these disturbing powers that make men tremble before the power of kings and gods, disappear in the case of the shepherd (*pasteur*), whether it is the king-shepherd or the god-shepherd.

Finally, the last feature, which confirms some of things I have been saying, is the idea that pastoral power is an individualizing power. That is to say, it is true that the shepherd directs the whole flock, but he can only really direct it insofar as not a single sheep escapes him. The shepherd counts the sheep; he counts them in the morning when he leads them to pasture, and he counts them in the evening to see that they are all there, and he looks after each of them individually. He does everything for the totality of his flock, but he does everything also for each sheep of the flock. And it is here that we come to the famous paradox of the shepherd, which takes two forms. On the one hand, the shepherd must keep his eye on all and on each, *omnes et singulatin*,³⁸ which will be the great problem both of the techniques of power in Christian pastoralship, and of the, let's say, modern techniques of power deployed in the technologies of population I have spoken about. *Omnes et singulatin*. And then, in an even more intense manner, the second form taken by the paradox of the shepherd is the problem of the sacrifice of the shepherd for his flock, the sacrifice of himself for the whole of his flock, and the sacrifice of the whole of his flock for each of the sheep. What I mean is that, in this Hebrew theme of the flock, the shepherd owes everything to his flock to the extent of agreeing to sacrifice himself for its salvation.³⁹ But, on the other hand, since he must save each of the sheep, will he not find himself in a situation in which he has to neglect the whole of the flock

in order to save a single sheep? This theme, with Moses at its center, is endlessly repeated in all the different sedimentations of the Biblical text from Genesis up to the rabbinical commentaries. Moses really was prepared to abandon the whole of the flock in order to save a single sheep that had gone astray. Finally he found the sheep and brought it back on his shoulders, and at that moment, it turns out that the flock he was prepared to sacrifice was nonetheless saved, symbolically, precisely by the fact that he was prepared to sacrifice it.⁴⁰ This is central to the challenge, to the moral and religious paradox of the shepherd, or what could be called the paradox of the shepherd: the sacrifice of one for all, and the sacrifice of all for one, which will be at the absolute heart of the Christian problematic of the pastorate.

To sum up, we can say that the idea of a pastoral power is the idea of a power exercised on a multiplicity rather than on a territory. It is a power that guides towards an end and functions as an intermediary towards this end. It is therefore a power with a purpose for those on whom it is exercised, and not a purpose for some kind of superior unit like the city, territory, state, or sovereign [...*]. Finally, it is a power directed at all and each in their paradoxical equivalence, and not at the higher unity formed by the whole. I think the structures of the Greek city-state and the Roman Empire were entirely foreign to this type of power. You will say that there are a number of texts in Greek literature in which there is a very explicit comparison between political power and the power of the shepherd. There is *The Statesman*, which, as you know, is engaged in precisely this type of research. What is the one who rules? What is it to rule? Is it not exercising power over a flock?

Good, listen, I feel really lousy. I cannot go into all this, and ask you if we can stop now. I really am too tired. I will talk about this again, the problem of *The Statesman* in Plato next week. I would just like to indicate roughly—well, if I have given you this very clumsy schema, it is because it seems to me that we have a very important phenomenon, which is that the idea of a pastoral power, which is entirely foreign, or at any rate considerably foreign to Greek and Roman thought, was introduced into the Western world by way of the Christian Church. The Christian Church

* An inaudible word.

coagulated all these themes of pastoral power into precise mechanisms and definite institutions, it organized a pastoral power that was both specific and autonomous, it implanted its apparatuses within the Roman Empire, and at the heart of the Empire it organized a type of power that I think was unknown to any other civilization. This really is the paradox and the subject on which I would like to focus in the next lectures. Of all civilizations, the Christian West has undoubtedly been, at the same time, the most creative, the most conquering, the most arrogant, and doubtless the most bloody. At any rate, it has certainly been one of the civilizations that has deployed the greatest violence. But, at the same time, and this is the paradox I would like to stress, over millennia Western man has learned to see himself as a sheep in a flock, something that assuredly no Greek would have been prepared to accept. Over millennia he has learned to ask for his salvation from a shepherd (*pasteur*) who sacrifices himself for him. The strangest form of power, the form of power that is most typical of the West, and that will also have the greatest and most durable fortune, was not born in the steppe or in the towns. This form of power so typical of the West, and unique, I think, in the entire history of civilizations, was born, or at least took its model from the fold, from politics seen as a matter of the sheep-fold.

1. See the previous lecture, 1 February, p. 104 and p. 106 concerning economy as "science of government," and p. 107: "an art of government that has now crossed the threshold of political science."
2. On this notion, see above, lecture of 18 January, p. 33.
3. R. Castel, *L'Ordre psychiatrique. L'âge d'or de l'aliénisme* (Paris: Mimiit, "Le sens commun," 1976; English translation by W.D. Hall, *The Regulation of Madness: the origins of incarceration in France* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988)).
4. See, *ibid.*, ch. 3, pp. 138-152 ("L'aliénisme, l'hygiénisme et la philanthropie"); *ibid.*, pp. 112-124 ("The Mental Health Specialist, the Hygienist and the Philanthropist"). See on pp. 142-143 (trans. pp. 116-117), the quotations from the prospectus presenting the *Annales d'hygiène publique et de médecine légale*, founded in 1829 by Marc and Esquirol ("public hygiene, which is the art of preserving the health of people gathered together in society and which is destined to be very greatly developed and to provide numerous applications for the improvement of our institutions").
5. *Ibid.*, ch. 1, pp. 39-50 ("Le criminel, l'enfant, le mendiant, le prolétaire et le fou"); trans. *ibid.*, pp. 28-38 ("Criminal, Child, Beggar, Poor Wage-earner and Mad person").
6. *Ibid.*, ch. 5, pp. 208-215 ("Les opérateurs politiques"); trans. *ibid.*, pp. 171-180 ("The Political Operators").
7. In the 1973-1974 lectures, *Le Pouvoir psychiatrique. Psychiatrie Power, going back over various points in Histoire de la folie, Madness and Civilization*, that according to him could be challenged Foucault questions for the first time the criticism of psychiatric power in terms of the institution and sets against it a criticism founded on the analysis of relations of power, or the micro-physics of power. See the lecture of 7 November 1973, p. 16; p. 15; "I no longer think that the institution is a very satisfactory notion. It seems to me that it harbors a number of dangers, because as soon as we talk about institutions we are basically talking about both individuals and the group, we take the individual, the group, and the rules which govern them as given, and as a result we can throw in all the psychological or sociological discourses. [...] What is important [...] is not institutional regularities, but much more the practical dispositions of power, the characteristic networks, currents, relays, points of support, and differences of a form of power, which are, I think, constitutive of, precisely, both the individual and the group." See the lecture of 14 November 1973, p. 34; p. 33: "Let's be really anti-institutionalist." See too, *Surveiller et Punir*, p. 217; *Discipline and Punish*, p. 215; "Discipline' may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus (*appareil*)."
8. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), *Panopticon, or the Inspection House . . .*, in *Works*, ed. J. Bowring (Edinburgh: Tait, 1838-1843) vol. IV, pp. 37-66; French translation, *Panoptique. Mémoire sur un nouveau principe pour construire des maisons d'inspection, et notamment des maisons de force*, trans. E. Dumont (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1791), republished in *Œuvres de Jérémy Bentham*, ed. E. Dumont (Brussels: Louis Hauman and Co., 1829) vol. 1, pp. 245-262. The French translation is reproduced in J. Bentham, *Le Panoptique*, preceded by M. Foucault, "L'œil du pouvoir"; "The eye of power" and followed by a translation by M. Sissung of the first part of the original version of *Panopticon*, as published by Bentham in England in 1791. The most recent English edition is, Jeremy Bentham, *The Panopticon Writings*, ed. M. Božović (New York and London: Verso, 1995). See *Surveiller et Punir*, pp. 201-206; *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 200-209.
9. See, "L'éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté" (January 1984) *Dis et Être*, 4, p. 726; English translation by P. Arator and D. McGraw, "The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom" in *Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol. 1: Ethics, subjectivity and truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997) p. 297: "I have been seen as saying that madness does not exist, whereas the problem is absolutely the converse: it was a question of knowing how madness, under the various definitions that have been given, was at a particular time integrated into an institutional field that constituted it as a mental illness occupying a specific place alongside other illnesses." According to Paul Veyne, this was how Raymond Aron, for example, understood *Histoire de la folie, Madness and Civilization*.
10. See Paul Veyne, "Foucault révolutionnaire Phisotore" (1978) in Paul Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire* (Paris: Le Seuil, "Points Histoire," 1979) p. 229. Veyne's essay on Foucault is not

- included in the English translation of the first, 1971 edition of his book, *Writing History: Essay on Epistemology*, trans. Mina Moore-Rimoldi (Middletown, Conn.: Western University Press, 1984). The essay is translated by Catherine Porter, "Foucault Revolutionizes History" in Arnold I. Davidson, ed., *Foucault and his Interlocutors* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997) p. 170: "When I showed the present text to Foucault, he responded roughly as follows: 'I personally have never written that *madness does not exist*, but it can be written; because, for phenomenology, madness exists, but is not a thing; whereas one has to say on the contrary that madness does not exist, but that it is not therefore nothing.'"
11. The manuscript (unnumbered page inserted between pages 14 and 15) refers to the *Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française et de tous ses dialectes du IX^e au XV^e* of Frédéric Godéroy (Paris: F. Vieweg, 1885) vol. IV.
 12. "Un petit chemin si étroit, qu'un homme à cheval seroit assez empêché d'y passer outre, ne deux hommes ne s'y pourroient gouverner" Froissart, *Chroniques*, 1559, Book I, p. 72, cited by F. Godéroy, *Dictionnaire*, p. 326.
 13. "Si y avoit à Paris plus de blé que homme qui fist ne en ce temp y eust oncques veu, car on temoignoit qu'il y en avoit pour beau gouverneur Paris pour plus de 2 ans entiers," *Journal de Paris sous Charles VI*, p. 77, cited by F. Godéroy, *Dictionnaire*, p. 325.
 14. "Il n'avoit de quoy vivre ni gouverner sa femme qui estoit malade" 1425, Arch. JJ 173, pièce 186, cited by Godéroy, *ibid.*
 15. "Pour ces jours avant ung chevalier et une dame de trop grand gouvernement, et se nommoit li sire d'Ambricoourt." Froissart, *Chroniques* vol. II, p. 4, cited by Godéroy, *ibid.*
 16. "Une grosse ville non fermee qui s'appelle Senarpoint et se gouverner toute de la draperie" Froissart, *Chroniques*; Book V, cited by Godéroy, *ibid.* p. 326.
 17. "De laquelle bature icellui Philippe a esté malade par l'espace de trois semaines ou environ, tant a l'Ostel Dieu ou il fu porté comme en son hostel, et depuis par son mauvais gouvernement, est alé de vie a trespassement" 1423, Arch. JJ 172, pièce 186, cited by Godéroy, *ibid.* p. 325.
 18. "Une fille qui avoit esté de mauvais gouvernement" H. Estienne, *Apol. P. Hérod.*, c. 15, cited by Godéroy, *ibid.*
 19. "Il fit bonne chiere a tous, voire aux principaux des Seize, qui le gouvernement pendant son souper" Pagn, *Letz*, XVII, 2, cited by Godéroy, *ibid.*
 20. "Un quidam qui gouvernait la femme de son voisin et l'alloit voir si souvent qu'à la fin le mari y eut aperçut" G. Bouchet, *Serées*, III, p. 202, cited by Godéroy, *ibid.* This is also cited by Litttré, *Dictionnaire de la langue française* (Paris: J.-J. Pauvert, 1957) vol. 4, p. 185.
 21. Foucault frequently took an interest in this drama in the years between 1970 and 1980. See the lectures of 1970-1971, "La Volonté de savoir," 12th lecture (summarized in a lecture at Cornell in October 1972); "La vérité et les formes juridiques" (1974) *Dits et Ecrits*, 2, pp. 553-568; English translation by Robert Hurley, "Truth and Juridical Forms," *Essential Works of Foucault*, 3, pp. 1-89; the first lectures of the 1979-1980 series, "Du gouvernement des vivants" (16 and 23 January and 1 February); the Louvain seminar of May 1981, "Mal faire, dire vrai. Fonction de l'aveu" (unpublished).
 22. In fact the image only appears once in *Oedipus the King*. See the French translation by R. Pignarre (Paris: Garnier, 1964) p. 122: "My king, I have said to you before, and I say it again, / I would prove mad and foolish / if I were to abandon you, you / who, when my country was beset by storm, / was the good wind that guided it. Ah! Once again, / if you can, lead us to safe harbor today." [Cf. the English translation by David Grene, which refers to "you who steered the country," but not explicitly to harbor or port; "Oedipus the King" in David Grene and Richmond Lattimore, eds., *Sophocles I* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991) pp. 40-41; G.B.] It is, however, a recurrent theme in Sophocles: *Ajax*, 1082; *Antigone*, 162, 190. See P. Louis, *Les Mythes de Platon*, p. 156, n. 18.
 23. The Parolais were designated as the shepherds (*bergers*) of their people from the 12th dynasty, under the Middle Empire at the beginning of the 2nd millennium. See D. Müller, "Der gute Hirt. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte ägyptischer Bildrede," *Zeitschrift für Ägyptologie*, 86, 1961, pp. 126-144.
 24. The description of the king as pastor (*ἄρῆ*) goes back to Hammurabi (around 1728-1686). Most of the Assyrian kings, up to Assurbanipal (669-626) and the neo-Babylonian

- monarchs, will adopt this custom. See L. Dürr, *Ursprung und Ausbau der israelisch-jüdischen Heilandsanfangung. Ein Beitrag zur Theologie des Alten Testaments* (Berlin: C.A. Schwetschke & Sohn, 1925) pp. 116-120.
25. See I. Seibert, *Hirt-Herde-König. Zur Heranbildung des Königtums in Mesopotamien* (Berlin: Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaft zu Berlin, Schriften der Section für Altertumswissenschaft, 53, 1969).
 26. "Hymne à Amon-Rê" (Le Caire, c.1430 B.C.E.) in A. Barucq and F. Daumas, *Hymnes et Pères de l'Égypte ancienne*, no. 69 (Paris: Le Cerf, 1980) p. 198.
 27. Source unidentified. On the divine origin of royal power, which expresses the image of the shepherd (*pasteur*), see I. Seibert, *Hirt-Herde-König*, pp. 7-9.
 28. There is a considerable literature on this subject. See, W. Jost, *Poëmes. Das Bild vom Hirten in der biblischen Überlieferung und seine christologische Bedeutung* (Gießen: Otto Kindt, 1939); G.E. Post, "Sheep," in *Dictionary of the Bible* (Edinburgh: 1902) vol. 4, pp. 486-487; V. Hamp, (1) "Das Hirtenmotiv im Alten Testament," in *Festschrift Kard. Faulhaber* (Munich: J. Pfeiffer, 1949) pp. 7-20, and (2) "Hirt," in *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* (Freiburg im Breisgau: 1960) col. 384-386. On the New Testament: Th. H. Kempf, *Christus der Hirt. Ursprung und Deutung einer altchristlichen Symbolgestalt* (Rome: Officium Libri Catholici, 1942); J. Jeremias, "Ποιμήν," in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament*, Bd. 6, 1959, pp. 484-501. Among more recent studies we note the article by P. Grelot, "Berger," in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique* (Paris: Beauchesne) 1984) vol. 12, col. 361-372, and the good synthesis accompanied by a very rich bibliography, by D. Peil, *Untersuchungen zur Staats- und Herrschaftsmetaphorik in literarischen Zeugnissen von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Munich: W. Fink, 1983) pp. 29-164 ("Hirt und Herde").
 29. This title is not applied directly to him in the historical and sapiential books. See the second book of Samuel, 5, 2; 24, 17; Psalms 78, 70-72; God entrusts the "grazing (*paître*)" of the people of Israel to him and David designates the latter as a "flock." On the other hand, the designation is more frequent in the prophetic books: see, for example, Ezekiel, 34, 23; 37, 24 ("My serrat David will reign over them, one shepherd for all" (New Jerusalem Bible)). As Foucault suggests, the image of the shepherd is sometimes used to designate pagan kings: see Isaiah, 44, 28 (with reference to Cyrus); Jeremiah, 25, 34; Zechariah, 11, 4-14. See W. Jost, *Poëmes*, p. 19 sq. Obviously there are many more occurrences of the application of pastoral vocabulary to Yahweh ("to guide," "to lead," "to herd," "to lead to pasture," etcetera). See, J. Jeremias, "Ποιμήν," p. 466.
 31. See Jeremiah, 17, 16 (but the translation of this passage has been questioned): Amos, 1, 1; 7, 14-15. See W. Jost, *Poëmes*, p. 16.
 32. See Isaiah, 56, 11; Jeremiah, 2, 8; 10, 21; 12, 10; 23, 1-3; Ezekiel, 34, 2-10 ("Dissaser is in store for the shepherds of Israel who feed themselves! Are not shepherds meant to feed a flock? Yet you have fed on milk, you have dressed yourselves in wool, you have sacrificed the fattest sheep, but failed to feed the flock. You have failed to make weak sheep strong, or to care for the sick ones, or to bandage the injured ones. You have failed to bring back strays or look for the lost. On the contrary you have ruled them cruelly and harshly" *New Jerusalem Bible*); Zechariah, 10, 3; 11, 4-17; 13, 7.
 33. Psalms, 68, 7.
 34. Exodus, 15, 13.
 35. Foucault is alluding here to the maxim "Salus populi suprema lex esto," the first occurrence of which is found—with a quite different meaning—in Cicero, *De legibus*, 3, 3, 8, with regard to the duty of magistrates to apply the law zealously, and which was taken up from the sixteenth century by most of the theorists of absolutism. See above, lecture of 1 February, note 27, the quotation from Pufendorf's *De officio hominis et civis*; On the *Duty of Man and Citizen*. See, J. Engemann, "Hirt," in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* (Stuttgart: 1991) vol. 15, col. 589: "Andererseits blieb ihnen (= den Rabbinen) dennoch bewußt, daß Mose, gerade weil er ein guter Hirt war, von Gott erwählt wurde, das Volk Israel zu führen (Midr. Ex. 2, 2): L. Ginzberg, *The legends of the Jews*, 7, trans. from the German manuscript by Henrietta Scold (Philadelphia: Jewish Publ. Soc. of America, 1938) Reg. s.v. shepherd." See also Philo of Alexandria, *De vita Moysis*, I, 60 (according to D. Peil, *Untersuchungen*, p. 43, n. 59); Justin Martyr, *Apologies*, 62, 3 (according to W. Jost, *Poëmes*, p. 14, n. 1).

37. Phrase already quoted above, p. 124.
 38. See the lectures, "*Omnes et singulati*"; Toward a critique of political reason," given by Foucault at the University of Stanford in October 1979, in *Essential Works of Foucault*, 3, pp. 298-325; French translation by P.-E. Dauzat, "*Omnes et singulati*"; vers une critique de la raison politique," *Dis et Léris*, 4, pp. 134-161.
 39. See, John, 11, 50; 18, 14; "... it was better for one man to die for the people."
 40. See the next lecture, 15 February, p. 152.



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Analysis of the pastorate (continuation). ~ The problem of the shepherd-flock relationship in Greek literature and thought: Homer, the Pythagorean tradition. Rareness of the shepherd metaphor in classical political literature (Isocrates, Demosthenes). ~ A major exception: Plato's The Statesman. The use of the metaphor in other Plato texts (Critias, Laws, The Republic). The critique of the idea of a magistrate-shepherd in The Statesman. The pastoral metaphor applied to the doctor, farmer, gymnast, and teacher. ~ The history of the pastorate in the West, as a model of the government of men, is inseparable from Christianity. Its transformations and crises up to the eighteenth century. Need for a history of the pastorate. ~ Characteristics of the "government of souls": encompassing power coextensive with the organization of the Church and distinct from political power. ~ The problem of the relationships between political power and pastoral power in the West. Comparison with the Russian tradition.

IN EXPLORING THIS THEME of governmentality I have begun an extremely vague sketch, not of the history, but of some reference points that allow us to shed a little light on what I believe has been so important in the West and that we can call, and is in fact called, the pastorate. All of these reflections on governmentality, this very vague sketch of the pastorate, should not be taken as gospel truth. This is not finished work, it is not even work that's been done; it is work in progress, with